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LOOKING FOR A NONLEGAL PROCESS: PHYSICIAN-
ASSISTED SUICIDE AND THE CARE PERSPECTIVE
Paul J. Zwier*
One of the many benefits of an interdisciplinary seminar like
the Allen Chair-sponsored Bioethics seminar held at the Uni-
versity of Richmond Law School in 1995 was that members of
the seminar had the opportunity to study the effects of the
legal system's attempt to regulate bioethical issues. No question
proved more troubling for the seminar than the question of
physician-assisted suicide. Seminar participants, both members
of the class and speakers, divided deeply on the legality of
physician-assisted suicide, and for good reason. The discussions
started with court decisions that were found to be both divisive
and unsatisfactory.' A number of recent court decisions dealing
with physician-assisted suicide2 brought home the point that
there are some dilemmas in life whose outcomes should not be
left to the courts.' Not only were the courts' holdings hopeless-
* Professor of Law, University of Richmond of Law. Professor Zwier coordinated
the Allen Chair Seminar in 1995. He has also served on the Medical College of Vir-
ginia Hospital Ethics Committee since 1991.
1. The seminar members were not alone in their dissatisfaction with the legal
analysis. See Michael R. Flick, Comment, The Due Process of Dying, 79 CAL. L. REV.
1121 (1991); Carl E. Schneider, Bioethics with a Human Face, 69 IND. L.J. 1075
(1994).
2. The most recent is Lee v. Oregon, 891 F. Supp. 1429 (D. Ore. 1995). I will
also discuss other recent cases that deal with end-of-life issues that have physician-
assisted suicide implications, including Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dept. of Health,
497 U.S. 261 (1989); In re Baby K, 16 F.3d 590 (4th Cir. 1994); Quill v. Koppel, 870
F. Supp. 78 (S.D.N.Y. 1994); Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 850 F. Supp. 1454
(W.D. Wash. 1994) rev'd, 49 F.3d 586 (9th Cir.), rehg granted, 62 F.3d 299 (1995) (en
banc).
3. One such situation in which the courts declare themselves ineligible, or at
least reluctant, is where the courts are asked to determine whether corporate boards
of directors have breached their duty of care to their shareholders. See WILLIAM L.
CARY & MELVIN A. EISENBERG, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CORPORATIONS 541 (6th ed.
1988).
In many areas of law, a distinction is drawn between substance and
process. The duty of care may be understood in that way too. In effect,
the business judgment rule gives wide latitude to a substantive decision
of a director or senior executive if, but only if, he has followed a process
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ly contradictory to earlier pronouncements, but the courts' anal-
yses were unsatisfactory due to the bipolarization caused by the
language of equality and rights that pervaded the legal analy-
ses.4 The courts' decisions seemed simply to miss the real is-
sues and were unable to weigh the particular circumstances in
which physician-assisted suicide seemed appropriate.5
When our discussion turned from the analysis of the courts'
rulings and struggled instead with resolutions of individual
patient cases, the class started to come together.' In certain
individual cases the class agreed that assisting someone in
committing suicide would be wrong, but in other cases they
were more comfortable with leaving, or at least willing to leave,
the decision to a group consisting of the patient, physician,
nurse, family and friends.! Where there was real proof of a car-
that is reasonable, in terms of due preparation, in arriving at that deci-
sion. The process elements of the duty of care, involving such matters as
preparing to make a decision, general monitoring, and following up suspi-
cious circumstances, are governed by a standard of reasonability, while
the substantive element, involving review of management decisions, is
governed by the much looser standard of rationality.
Id. See also Smith v. Van Gorkum, 488 A.2d 858 (1985) (describing the elaborate
process that the board should go through in deciding whether to recommend a sale of
the corporation to the corporation's shareholders).
4. See Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 850 F. Supp. 1454 (W.D. Wash.
1994) rev'd, 49 F.3d 586 (9th Cir.), reh'g granted, 62 F.3d 299 (1995) (en banc); Peter
Westen, The Empty Idea of Equality, 95 HARv. L. REV. 537 (1982); cf. Kent
Greenawalt, How Empty is the Idea of Equality?, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 1167 (1983).
5. Westen, supra note 4, at 581-84.
6. Cases which were not presented as legal opinions, but as patient dilemmas,
include Bouvia v. Superior Court, 225 Cal. Rptr. 297 (1986); Brophy v. New England
Sinai Hosp., 497 N.E.2d 626 (Mass. 1986). Bouvia was a case involving a twenty-
eight-year-old woman who was afflicted with cerebral palsy and degenerative arthritis.
She was almost completely paralyzed, suffered continual pain, and needed constant
nursing care. Although not terminally ill, she had no chance of recovery and would
need continual medical care for the fifteen to twenty years her doctors expected her
to live. Her family and friends were no longer able to house and care for her. She
checked herself into a California hospital to die. She did not want to be fed. When
the hospital refused, she sought a court order. Once it was attained, she decided to
accept treatment. Brophy was a case involving a comatose patient's wife who sought
successfully on her husband's behalf to have his feeding tubes removed because he
had previously indicated that he would not want treatment in such circumstances.
7. Ann Hanu-ic, a clinical nurse specialist and member of the Medical College of
Virginia's Ethics Committee, presented the case of Stan to the seminar. [hereinafter
Stan's Case]. Stan was almost seventeen, a junior in high school, and an excellent
gymnast when he fell head first off the rings during practice. He sustained a C1
spinal fracture and contusion of the spinal cord which resulted in total paralysis from
the neck down. After six months, he had no return of function, and he remained
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ing and loving decision-making process that valued the patient
and understood not only his or her medical situation but also
his or her social and psychological setting, then the allowance
for physician-assisted suicide was made.8
It became clear that a new way of looking at the problem
was needed, one that relied less on universal principles like
"equal protection" and "rights," and instead borrowed from
bioethics,9 and more particularly from the care perspective.10
Using a care perspective, society would be better able to deal
with the real issues that are involved in physician-assisted
suicide and create a framework that would allow both for ade-
quate safeguards and individualized analysis." By using a
paralyzed and ventilator-dependent. Stan could mouth words, but could not talk be-
cause of his tracheotomy. Stan spent three months trying to identify ways of ending
his life. He first asked to become a Christian Scientist so that he could refuse treat-
ment on religious grounds. He refused to eat, so the medical team inserted a
nasogastric tube which was so unpleasant that he agreed to eat again. He was placed
on Elavil for continued "depression." He sought a lawyer to be declared an emancipat-
ed minor so that- he could sue his parents for the right to refuse treatment. The
lawyer refused. Stan's mother was very upset about his questions, often crying and
looking away so she could not read his lips. His father refused to talk to him and
left the room whenever Stan started to talk about dying. Both parents insisted that
he would get better and were opposed to any plan for ending his life.
8. See id.
9. See TOM L. BEAUCHAMP & JAMES F. CHILDRESS, PRINCIPLES OF BIOMEDICAL
ETHICS (4th ed. 1994). The authors write:
Another family of moral reflections is widely referred to as the ethics of
care. It shares some premises with communitarian ethics, including some
objections to central features of liberalism and an emphasis on traits
valued in intimate personal relationships, such as sympathy, compassion,
fidelity, discernment, and love. Caring in these accounts refers to care
for, emotional commitment to, and willingness to act on behalf of persons
with whom one has a significant relationship. Noticeably downplayed are
Kantian universal rules, impartial utilitarian calculations, and individual
rights.
Id. at 85.
10. The ethics of care is more fully described later in the paper. See generally
CAROL GILLIGAN, IN A DIFFERENT VOICE: A PSYCHOLOGICAL THEORY AND WOMEN'S
DEvELOPMENT (1982); NEL NODDINGS, CARING, A FEMININE APPROACH TO ETHICS AND
MORAL EDUCATION (1984); Alisa L. Came, The 'Voice of Care': Implications for
Bioethical Education, 16 J. MED. & PHIL. 5 (1991); Carol Gilligan, Moral Orientation
and Moral Development, in WOMEN AND MORAL THEORY 19 (Eva F. Kittay & Diana
T. Meyers eds., 1987); Diana T. Meyers, The Socialized Individual and Individual
Autonomy: An Intersection between Philosophy and Psychology, in WOMEN AND MORAL
THEORY 139 (Eva F. Kittay & Diana T. Meyers eds., 1987).
11. In constitutional law, the courts have developed the doctrine of
nonjusticiability of "political questions." See, e.g., Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
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care perspective, care providers for the terminally ill would be
able to insure that caring and careful decisions would be
reached about when to assist a patient in her wish to end her
life.
This article will first review the cases that deal with physi-
cian-assisted suicide and show how unsatisfactory the legal
analysis has been. Second, it will describe a care perspective
and demonstrate how a perspective that revolves around caring,
listening, and consensus-building improves and enhances the
moral responsibility for the choices that are to be made. Reject-
ing blanket legal solutions, I will discuss how the care perspec-
tive also better deals with the psychological factors of depres-
sion and hopelessness that bring about the suicide request in
the first place. Part of this section will argue that the law pro-
hibiting suicide has the reverse effect of that intended and
causes more suicides; that studies of attempted suicide suggest
that in listening to and respecting a request for suicide, the
It is apparent that several formulations which vary slightly according to
the settings in which the questions arise may describe a political ques-
tion, although each has one or more elements which identify it as essen-
tially a function of the separation of powers. Prominent on the surface of
any case held to involve a political question is found a textually demon-
strable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political
department; or a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards
for resolving it; or the impossibility of deciding without an initial policy
determination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion; or the impossi-
bility of a court's undertaking independent resolution without expressing
lack of the respect due coordinate branches of government; or an unusual
need for unquestioning adherence to a political decision already made; or
the potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements by
various departments on one question.
Id. at 216-17.
My idea is to create a new "branch of government." I have in mind one like a
jury but composed of people who know and care for the patient and have a stake in
the patient's reaching a good decision. See infra part III.
In addition, the courts have recognized in other situations that they should
resist becoming too involved in making the decision. Even in the more mundane
world of corporate decision-making, the courts have given the corporation's board of
directors the power to make the decisions that legally bind the corporation, and the
courts grant the board the protection of the business judgment rule. State statutes
provide that the board's litigation committee can move to dismiss shareholder com-
plaints if the litigation committee shows that they fully investigated the matter and
are acting independently. Some courts go further and second-guess the business judg-
ment of the committee, while others will dismiss if the procedural requirements of
the statute are met. I propose that this same procedural protection be given to care
providers who assist in suicide.
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patient will more likely be persuaded not to commit suicide.
Finally, I will suggest a framework in which the care perspec-
tive can be implemented, which should satisfy concerns about
care providers' abuse of helpless and depressed patients when
we allow for the possibility that patients be assisted in suicide.
I. LEGAL SETTING
A. Statement of the Philosophical Problem
One problem that leads to a tortured legal analysis of physi-
cian-assisted suicide is philosophical. It is referred to as the
slippery slope:' how do we decide when a person is "reason-
able" in a request to end his or her life without opening the
door to honoring the request of the momentarily depressed
patient or the request of someone who is highly susceptible to
inappropriate suggestion? And, how do we adequately guard
against society's bias against the old and sick because of cost
factors of medical care at the end of life?
Traditional criminal law once tried to answer the questions
clearly."3 It not only prohibited the assistance of suicide, it
prohibited suicide itself.'4 Taking the view that life was sa-
cred, and that the individual's life was in God's hands and not
in the individual's own, the law prohibited someone from taking
12. Tom L. Beauchamp, A Reply to Rachels on Active and Passive Euthanasia, in
ETHICAL IssuEs IN DEATH AND DYING 246 (Tom L. Beuchamp & Seymour Perlin eds.,
1978); Eugenie A. Gifford, Artes Moriendi: Active Euthanasia and the Art of Dying, 40
UCLA L. REV. 1545, 1568 (1993); see Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 49 F.3d
586, 591 (9th Cir. 1995), reh'g granted, 62 F.3d 299 (1995) (en banc). The Ninth Cir-
cuit reasoned:
If at the heart of the liberty protected by the Fourteenth Amendment is
the uncurtailable ability to believe and to act on one's deepest beliefs
about life, the right to suicide and the right to assistance in suicide are
the prerogative of at least every same adult. The attempt to restrict such
rights to the terminally ill is illusory. If such liberty exists in this con-
text, . . . every man and woman in the United States must enjoy it....
The conclusion is a reductio ad absurdum.
Compassion in Dying, 49 F.3d at 591 (emphasis added).
13. See Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 292 (Scalia, J.
concurring); Thomas J. Marzen et al., Suicide: A Constitutional Right?, 24 DUQ. L.
REV. 1 (1985).
14. See Marzen, supra note 13, at 67 (detailing the acceptance by the thirteen
colonies of the English common law which treated suicide as a crime).
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his own life.'" Yet, even early on, there was deep division on
the question of the morality of suicide. 6 Was it not the height
of morality for an individual to sacrifice herself in the waning
moments of life for the benefit of those she left behind? 7 Or
was suicide always a weak and faithless response to the fear of
pain and the fear of the unknown?" The American response to
the moral debate was to gradually do away with the criminal
treatment of suicide attempts. 9 Add to the moral and legal
debate about suicide the "improved" life-ending technology and
the prospect of technology endlessly prolonging the body long
after life had left it,2" and the prohibitions against suicide be-
come even weaker.2 The cost of life-sustaining technology has
proved enormous.22 These huge costs in artificial life support
technology add to the moral calculation that suicide may be a
legitimate act of self-sacrifice.23
Yet, while no longer prohibiting suicide, criminal law has
continued to prohibit assisting suicide on the grounds that it is
troublesomely close to murder.24 The distinction that criminal
15. Id. at 20-27.
16. Id. at 31-50.
17. Id. at 50-56.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 56-75.
20. The American Medical Association has recognized "that the dying process is
too often needlessly protracted by medical technology." AMA Council on Ethical and
Judicial Decisions Near End of Life, 267 JAMA 2229 (1992).
21. See Marjorie Shultz, From Informed Consent to Patient Choice: A New Pro-
tected Interest, 95 YALE L.J. 219, 295-96 (1985).
22. Some estimates of long-term nursing care run as high as $100,000 for the
average person. The average stay is 19 months and runs from $30,000 to $60,000 a
year. See PETER DAwSON & JOHN STAN, PUBLIC EXPENDITURES IN THE UNITED
STATES, 1952-1993 (1995) (detailing increases in public expenditures on health care).
23. See GERALD A. LARUE, EUTHANASIA AND RELIGION: A SURVEY OF THE ATTi-
TUDES OF WORLD RELIGIONS TO THE RIGHT-TO-DIE 1 (1985). One is reminded of the
biblical passage, "Greater love hath no man than this, that he lay down his life for
his friend." John 15:13. A 1981 survey of Christian laities' attitudes toward suicide
reveals that 61% would allow suicide for those with incurable disease. See Marzen,
supra note 13, at 56.
24. For example, the Model Penal Code provides in section 210.5 on causing or
aiding suicide: "(1) Causing Suicide as Criminal Homicide. A person may be convicted
of criminal homicide for causing another to commit suicide only if he purposely caus-
es such suicide by force, duress or deception." MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.5 (Tentative
Draft 1962); cf. Grace v. State, 69 S.W. 529, 530 (1902) ("We have no statute de-
nouncing suicidal acts; nor does our law denounce a punishment against those who
furnish the suicide with the means by which the suicide takes his own life."). But see
204 [Vol. 30:199
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law attempts to draw is that, while allowing someone to com-
mit suicide is not a crime, assisting or soliciting them to com-
mit suicide is." The distinction is said to be that between non-
feasance and misfeasance.2 6 Yet, the philosophical problem be-
tween nonfeasance and misfeasance, or withholding or with-
drawing treatment and causing someone's death, is also a trou-
blesome one." In fact, most commentators would say that the
distinction is meaningless in this context.28
The distinction between misfeasance and nonfeasance is trou-
bling because many commentators include in the definition of
an "act" the willful withholding of physical movement where
there is an earlier act, like a promise, that is not fulfilled, or a
status that gives rise to duty, that must be carried out." The
person is responsible for acting carelessly when she fails to do
something. ° Yet, the act can be labeled as "misfeasance" be-
Aven v. State, 277 S.W. 1080 (1925) (holding that a person who actually caused the
victim to put arsenic in her mouth and swallow it committed murder).
25. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.5 (1962). "Aiding or Soliciting Suicide as an
Independent Offense. A person who purposely aids or solicits another to commit sui-
cide is guilty of a felony of the second degree if his conduct causes such suicide or
an attempted suicide, and otherwise of a misdemeanor." Id. § 210.5(2).
26. See generally James Rachels, Active and Passive Euthanasia, 292 NEW ENG. J.
MED. 78 (1975).
27. Id.; cf. Beauchamp, supra note 12, at 249-53 (wherein Beauchamp admits that
the active/passive distinction is not a sufficient reason for distinguishing between
criminal and non-criminal activity, but argues that it is a reason that should be giv-
en some weight).
28. Cruzan v. Director, Missouri: Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 296 (Scalia, J.,
concurring); see Yale Kamisar, Some Non-Religious Views Against Proposed "Mercy-
Killing" Legislation, 42 MINN. L. REv. 969 (1958); Todd D. Robichand, Toward a More
Perfect Union: A Federal Cause of Action for Physician Aid in Dying, 27 U. MICH J.L.
REF. 521 (1994); Glanville Williams, "Mercy-Killing" Legislation-A Rejoinder, 43
MINN. L. REv. 1 (1958).
29. See WLiAm L. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 343-48 (4th ed.
1971).
30. Id. at 344. Prosser writes that "this idea of voluntary assumption of a duty
by affirmative conduct runs through a variety of cases. Just when the duty is under-
taken, when it ends and what conduct is required, are nowhere clearly defined, and
perhaps cannot be." Id. One of the reasons why Prosser may be right that the dis-
tinction between misfeasance and nonfeasance may never be clear is that there con-
tinues to be great difficulty in even defining what it means to say someone acted.
See Norman S. Care & Charles Landesman, Introduction to READINGS IN THE THEORY
OF ACTION xi-xxxv (Norman S. Care & Charles Landesman eds., 1968); see also P.J.
Fitzgerald, Voluntary and Involuntary Acts, in READINGS IN THE THEORY OF ACTION
373 (Norman S. Care & Charles Landesman eds., 1968). Fitzgerald argues that the
common law distinctions between those acts for which someone is or is not responsi-
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cause it can be described as acting in a way that is inappro-
priate.3 At the same time, the behavior can be described as
nonfeasance because the person was failing to act immediately
before the harm was caused. 32 For example, in an automobile
accident, the immediate cause can be that a person failed to
stop in time or failed to apply the brakes. However, an equally
apt description is that the driver was going too fast or was
looking where he should not have been looking. The artificiality
of the distinction arises from an inability to determine how
broadly to describe actions; whether to focus solely on the bit of
bodily behavior before injury or to include the acts that led up
to the inaction.33
To illustrate the above definitional problem in the medical
setting, take, for example, the hypothetical of someone running
through the intensive care unit of a hospital and intentionally
unplugging respirators.34 Would such a person have acted in a
way that makes them responsible for killing these patients?
Would they be criminally responsible? Of course they would.
The act is an act of killing, even though it involves the failure
to provide life support. What distinguishes, then, the doctor
from turning off the respirator? The doctor's conduct is not
excused because the act is one of nonfeasance.
When the courts deal with difficult questions of philosophy,
policy and value in other areas of the law and they want to
maintain an individualized case-by-case treatment of an issue,
they often attempt definitional solutions that try to make the
answers look objective and universal, yet process the decision
by allowing a jury to decide whether "a fact" exists. Some
courts give credence to the misfeasance/nonfeasance distinction
by giving to the jury the question posed earlier, of determining
whether a duty exists between two individuals that gives rise
to an obligation to act.35 In the alternative, the courts often
try the language of "proximate cause,"36 or of "natural vs. non-
ble can be drawn fairly on misfeasance and nonfeasance grounds. Fitzgerald, supra.
31. PROSSER, supra note 29, at 343-48.
32. Id.
33. Care & Landesman, supra note 30, at xvii-xxii.
34. See generally BEAUCHAMP & CHILDRESS, supra note 9, at 219.
35. Wierum v. RKO General, 539 P.2d 36 (1975); see also PROSSER, supra note
29.
36. Leon Green, The Causal Relation Issue in Negligence Law, 60 MICH. L. REV.
206 [Vol. 30:199
PAS AND THE CARE PERSPECTIVE
natural,"37 "reasonable vs. unreasonable,"" or "foreseeable vs.
unforeseeable,"39 or the distinction between "extraordinary and
ordinary,"' to create clear divisions where none exist. The
benefit of these "rules" is that the court can turn a question of
law into a question of fact and give the question to the jury for
case-by-case determination.
While the problem the legal cases tackle in physician-assisted
suicide is undoubtedly a very difficult, value-laden one, the
courts have yet to free up a case-by-case analysis by using the
jury through any of the above described legal language. Acts of
withholding and withdrawing are not excused because the cause
of death is natural. Nor do the courts find that there is some
intervening act on the part of the patient which breaks the
proximate causal chain of responsibility. Instead, withdrawal of
treatment by the doctor is said to be an act which foreseeably
causes the death of the individual.
The reason why withdrawal of technology by the doctor is ac-
ceptable in some circumstances is instead handled by proof of
intent. If the patient can be shown to have wanted withdrawal
or termination in these circumstances, then withdrawal is al-
lowed. As we will see, the courts' reliance on autonomy will
cause problems of its own in the case of physician-assisted
suicide. At this point it is important to see that the law has
turned the question of termination of life support into a ques-
tion of intent and has thereby made it a question of autonomy.
At the same time, it has provided a chance for the courts to
second-guess the decision to terminate by allowing a jury to
consider the proof of the patient's intent.
Before getting to the constitutionalization of this processing
by the courts, it is important to stop and consider the "real"
reasons for the court's allowance of termination of life support.
After all, the jury or fact finder would likely be asking a num-
543 (1962). Green argues that it is better to ask whether the risk of injury is within
the scope of duty that the defendant owed the plaintiff. In any event, he would give
the question to the jury. Id. at 552-55.
37. Rylands v. Fletcher, L.R. 3 H.L. 330 (1868).
38. Leon Green, Foreseeability in Negligence Law, 61 COLUM. L. REV. 1401 (1961).
39. Id.
40. BEAUCHAMP & CHILDRESS, supra note 9, at 200; see also PAUL RAiSEY, THE
PATIENT AS PERSON: EXPLORATIONS IN MEDICAL ETHICS 118-24 (1970).
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ber of value-laden questions when second-guessing the state of
proof of a person's intent to terminate life support. They would
ask not only whether the patient intended it but whether the
act is justified in the light of the prognosis that the person is
in a persistent vegetative state, has a terminal illness, and has
indicated in a living will or through a surrogate that the pa-
tient does not want to be maintained on a respirator. The act of
the doctor is justified by a balancing process of individual cir-
cumstances, with reference to autonomy and utilitarian prin-
ciples against waste, and for proper management with regard to
spending scarce health care dollars on the sick who have a
better prognosis.4  Yet, determining justifications involves
weighing of values and circumstances. The processing of this
weighing and valuing is first given to the physician, surrogate,
and/or family member, and only falls to the court if someone
complains.
B. Modern Cases Involving End of Life Issues
If we do justify physicians' acting to withdraw treatment,
then the problem with legal answers to the question of physi-
cian-assisted suicide is that we are already on the slippery
slope.42 How so? We have passed to the slippery slope once we
recognize that in some situations, withholding or withdrawing
treatment is acceptable because we permit the care provider to
act to bring about the end. That is what the court allowed in
Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Department of Health.'
In the Cruzan case, the Supreme Court recognized a privacy
right in allowing someone to make decisions about her own
health, even if that meant that she would want to end her
life." It found an inherent right of the individual to control
the decision as to when enough was enough and required the
physician to not only stand by while the individual wasted, but
indeed to remove life support, whether it be respirator, nutri-
tion tube, or hydration tube, in order that the end come soon-
41. See Rachels, supra note 26, at 80.
42. See generally BEAUCHAMP & CHILDRESS, supra note 9, at 226-27.
43. 497 U.S. 261 (1990).
44. Such a right is a liberty interest that is derived from the common law of
informed consent, which implies the right to refuse treatment. Id.
208
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er.4 s Not only could a state support the conscious request of a
patient, it could also set its own evidentiary standard for deter-
mining whether a surrogate could speak for an unconscious
patient where that patient had indicated a desire to have life
support withdrawn. The line that was crossed in Cruzan was
that the physician could "assist" in hastening death by with-
drawal of life support, which places the court on the downhill
side of the slippery slope. The withdrawal of technology in-
cludes an affirmative act of doing something, whether it be
removing a tube or turning off the respirator. The court said
that the question was one of the patient's autonomous right to
refuse treatment, which in turn justified the physician's act of
withdrawing or withholding treatment.4"
The same reasoning that the Supreme Court used in Cruzan
supports physician-assisted suicide. The doctor acts in prescrib-
ing medicine, usually a pain medication, that has the dual
effect of ending someone's life while attempting to relieve suf-
fering.47 By prescribing the medication, the doctor "flips the
switch." (While some argue that the patient still flips the
switch in taking the medicine, it is clear on foreseeability
grounds and substantial-certainty grounds that, in these cases,
the prescribing physician is at least a cause. If a physician
prescribes the wrong dose of a medicine, the physician does not
escape liability by saying that it was the patient's taking of the
medicine that caused his death.) In most cases, what is sought
is that the physician administer the medication, to make sure
nothing goes wrong, that the suicide is not botched, and that
the family is spared any of the gory death scene consequences.
The physician is thus actively involved in "letting the patient
die., 8
If we are already on the slippery slope when we allow for
withdrawal of treatment, it is not surprising that the courts
would be put in a difficult situation when analyzing physician-
45. Note, From Informed Consent to Patient Choice: A New Protected Interest, 95
YALE L.J. 219, 224-27 (1985).
46. Some have tried to base the distinction upon the difference between ordinary
and extraordinary acts in preservation of life. See RAMSEY, supra note 40, at 118-24.
47. For a philosophical discussion of the dual effects of treatments, see EKE-
HENNER W. KLUGE, THE ETHIcs OF DELIBERATIVE DEATH 15-18 (1981).
48. See RAMSEY, supra note 40, at 118-24.
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assisted suicide. The legal analysis is heavily influenced by
reasoning by analogy. The argument in favor of physician-as-
sisted suicide would assert that we need to take a careful look
at why withdrawal of treatment, flipping the switch or with-
drawing feeding and hydration, is allowed in some circumstanc-
es, and determine whether the same can be done for physician-
assisted suicide. That is essentially the process that the federal
district court went through in Compassion in Dying v. Wash-
ington.49
The Compassion in Dying case attempted to use the rights-
based analysis to uphold the argument for physician-assisted
suicide. The district court found that there was support for a
constitutional right to die in the privacy rights analysis in
Cruzan and in Planned Parenthood v. Casey.5" As stated earli-
er in Cruzan, the Supreme Court considered whether a compe-
tent person has a constitutionally protected liberty interest in
refusing unwanted life-sustaining medical treatment, including
artificially delivered food and water essential to prolonging
life."' Chief Justice Rehnquist, writing for the majority, ac-
knowledged that such a right "may be inferred from our prior
decisions"52 and that "the logic of the cases . . . would embrace
such a liberty interest."53 He then assumed for the purposes of
the case before the Court "that the United States Constitution
would grant a competent person a constitutionally protected
right to refuse lifesaving hydration and nutrition." '
The district court in Compassion in Dying also relied on
Planned Parenthood, one of the earlier decisions which dealt
with personal decisions regarding abortion. Planned Parenthood
reasoned as follows:
These matters, involving the most intimate and personal
choices a person may make in a lifetime, choices central to
personal dignity and autonomy, are central to the liberty
protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. At the heart of
49. 850 F. Supp. 1454 (W.D. Wash. 1994), rev'd, 49 F.3d 586 (9th Cir.), reh'g
granted 62 F.3d 299 (1995) (en banc).
50. 850 F. Supp. at 1459-62.
51. Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990).
52. Id. at 278.
53. Id. at 279.
54. Id.
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liberty is the right to define one's own concept of existence,
of meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery of human
life. Beliefs about these matters could not define the attrib-
utes of personhood were they formed under compulsion of
the State.'
In Compassion in Dying, the district court took the position
that "[fMrom a constitutional perspective, the court does not
believe that a distinction can be drawn between the refusal of
life-sustaining medical treatment and physician-assisted suicide
by an uncoerced, mentally competent, terminally ill adult."56
Once the "right" was established, the court found that the
Washington criminal statute against physician-assisted suicide
placed an undue burden on the patient's constitutional right.5 7
After all, protection from abuse would be just as necessary in
withdrawal cases, where the Washington statute allowed even a
surrogate to make the decision. The court also recognized that
equal protection principles supported physician-assisted sui-
cide.5" It held that if terminally ill persons on life support
could request physician assistance in terminating life support,
why shouldn't terminally ill persons not on life support be able
to request physician assistance? 9
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed. ° It found that
the language in Casey must have been taken out of context, in
that the language would support terminating life support for a
depressed twenty year old, the romantically devastated twenty-
eight year old, and the alcoholic forty year old who chose
suicide, because they are expressing their views of existence,
meaning, the universe and life.6' Quoting Yale Kamisar, the
Ninth Circuit found that if such liberty exists in this context,
as Casey asserted in the context of reproductive rights, every
55. Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 850 F. Supp. 1454, 1459 (W.D. 1994)
(quoting Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992)).
56. 850 F. Supp. at 1461.
57. Id. at 1465.
58. Id. at 1466-67.
59. Id.
60. 49 F.3d 586 (9th Cir.), reh'g granted, 62 F.3d 299 (1995) (en bane).
61. 49 F.3d at 590-91.
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man and woman in the United States must enjoy it.62 The
court held that such a conclusion is a reductio ad absurdum.63
The Ninth Circuit continued with a historical argument
against such a constitutional right to physician-assisted sui-
cide." In its opinion, 205 years of prohibiting assisted suicide
suggested that the right is not constitutional.65 Of course its
historical argument ignored recent history and the progress of
technology beyond anything contemplated by the criminal law
or the Constitution."
The circuit court also cited Alexander Capron's article, Eu-
thanasia in the Netherlands: American Observations,"7 for the
proposition that the self-understanding of physicians would be
affected by the removal of the state's support for their profes-
sional stance against assisted suicide.6" The court added to
Capron's position the statement that "[t]he physician's commit-
62. Id.; see Yale Kamisar, Are Laws Against Assisted Suicide Unconstitutional? 23
THE HASTINGS CENT. REP., May 1993, at 32, 36-37.
63. 49 F.3d at 591 (emphasis added).
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 591-92. Additionally, the Ninth Circuit cited two studies that had re-
cently concluded that physician-assisted suicide was a bad idea and had recommended
against a change in the law to permit physician-assisted suicide. First, Governor
Cuomo in 1985 set up a task force of twenty-four members, representing a broad
spectrum of ethical and religious views and ethical, health, legal, and medical com-
petencies. Its membership disagreed on the morality of suicide. Unanimously, the
members agreed against recommending a change in the New York law to permit
assisted suicide. NEW YORK STATE TASK FORCE, WHEN DEATH IS SOUGHT: ASSISTED
SUICIDE AND EUTHANASIA IN THE MEDICAL CONTEXT (1994). Second, a Michigan com-
mission, set up in 1992, voted by a majority in 1994 to recommend a legislative
change in the Michigan law. The Commission did not challenge the existing law
against physician-assisted suicide as unconstitutional. The court argued that since the
commission was deeply divided and did not find suicide unconstitutional, its only
option was to find that there was no right to suicide. MICHIGAN COMMISSION OF
DEATH AND DYING, FINAL REPORT (1994).
It is the "therefore" I find most troubling in the court's position. Where there is
deep moral division, there need not necessarily be a finding of no right. After all, in
the abortion cases, the court instead fashioned a sliding scale of a decision-making,
where before viability the mother has absolute control, and after viability, abortion is
legal only to save the life of the mother. Similarly, on the issue of physician-assisted
suicide, the court could fashion a decision-making system that would try to take into
account the particulars of the patient's situation, for which I will argue in part II,
infra.
67. Alexander M. Capron, Euthanasia in the Netherlands: American Observations,
22 THE HASTINGS CENTER REP., Mar.-Apr. 1992, at 30, 32.
68. 49 F.3d at 591.
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ment to curing is the medical profession's commitment to med-
ical progress. Medically-assisted suicide as an acceptable alter-
native is a blind alley; Washington has a stake in barring
it.))69
The court worried that such a change in the basic patient-
physician relationship that arises from even the possibility of
physician-assisted suicide would have a negative effect on the
elderly, on the poor, and on minorities.70 The court also stated
that Compassion in Dying is perhaps the sole case law of its
type, ignoring the Dutch experience. 1 The court's definitional
approach, then, (that a right is something that everyone must
have or no one may have), is the all or nothing support for the
court's finding that there is no right to commit suicide, and no
corresponding constitutional prohibition to criminally prosecut-
ing someone for assisting in suicide.
The court's analysis denies the inevitability of death. The
court seems afraid of the "blind alley" that the new world tech-
nology has brought. Rather than open itself up to the possibili-
ty that there could be adequate justification for assisted suicide,
it decides that patients always want physicians to favor push-
ing back the end of life further and further, no matter what the
cost or suffering. But what is the cost to society and to the
dignity of a particular individual?72 Also, what if everyone in
69. Id. at 592. Of course, what I argue with is whether the medical profession is
committed solely to curing, or also to caring. I will argue that a commitment to cur-
ing would justify technological support of a body, presumably until a cure is found.
This is also a reductio ad absurdum. A better perspective is a perspective of care,
which manages pain, and respects the autonomy of the patient and the care provid-
ers, as well as the perspectives of the patient's significant others in arriving at a
treatment plan. See infra part II.
70. 49 F.3d at 592.
71. John Keown, On Regulating Death, 22 THE HASTINGS CENTER REP., Mar.-Apr.
1992, at 39-44 (citing the concerns of Carlos F. Gomez, enumerated in CARLOS F.
GOMEZ, REGULATNG DEATH: EUTHANASIA AND THE CASE OF THE NETHERLANDS
(1991)).
72. See Joel Feinberg, Overlooking the Merits of the Individual Case: An Un-
promising Approach to the Right to Die, 4 RATIO JURIS. 131 (1991). Feinberg writes:
[Miost of the arguments against the legalization of voluntary euthanasia
(or in favor of creating legal impediments to it) are indirect arguments.
They don't argue that individual cases judged internally, that is on their
own merits, do not warrant euthanasia. Indeed, some of these arguments
candidly concede that judged on the merits, many individual cases do
deserve euthanasia. Rather these arguments favor deliberately overlooking
1996]
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the family and in a significant relationship with the individual
agreed and supported the patient's decision, including the medi-
cal care providers? The cases do not even reach these issues.73
So what do we have at this point? We have a federal district
court that logically analogizes to Cruzan and decides there is a
liberty interest or right to physician-assisted suicide. We also
have the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, a state supreme court,
and a federal district court74 that argue there is either no
right (because if there is a right everyone has it and that would
be absurd), or if there is a right, the court is justified in taking
it away from everyone. The rights-based language is stuck on
an all or nothing solution to a question of values and the defi-
nition of the meaning of life.
Enter Oregon. The source of Oregon's law was its electorate,
not its court.75 The referendum attempted to create a limited
the merits of individual cases, and cite extraneous considerations in favor
of a blanket prohibition. The most plausible of these arguments is the
argument from abusable discretion, which maintains that if legally com-
petent individuals are granted the discretion to decide on their own
whether in certain circumstances to continue or to terminate life-sustain-
ing treatment, the inevitability of honest mistakes and not-so-honest
abuses will create evils that outweigh the evils of sustaining the coma-
tose and the pain-wracked against their presumed wills. Convincing as
the argument from abusable discretion may be in some contexts, . . . it
fails in its application to the euthanasia situation, because it cannot be
shown that the likely number of mistakenly killed individuals would
constitute a greater evil than the likely number of mistakenly sustained
individuals. The philosophical problem of voluntary euthanasia errs in
minimizing the evils of human suffering and overrating the value of
merely biological life in the absence of a human person, or in the pres-
ence of a human person whose sufferings are too severe for him to have
a human life, even though his heart beats on.
Id. at 150-51.
73. It is next important to take a look at Michigan, because its experience with
Dr. Kevorkian prompted the state to study the issue even more closely. The Michigan
Supreme Court took a strong position against physician-assisted suicide, holding that
no constitutional right to end your life exists. The court relied on the distinction
between misfeasance and nonfeasance, and argued that ending something that you
need not have provided in the first place is different from acting to end a life. It
refused to describe when assistance was permitted by simply refusing to recognize the
right. Since the Michigan court said nothing about withdrawal of treatment, it is
unclear whether physicians are in violation of the statute when they flip the switch
in withdrawal cases. See also Quill v. Koppell, 870 F. Supp. 78 (S.D.N.Y. 1994)
(reaching the same result as the Michigan court).
74. See supra note 73.
75. Lee v. Oregon, 891 F. Supp. 1429, 1431 (D. Or. 1995).
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right to access to physician-assisted suicide. 6 Oregon's statute,
the Death with Dignity Act [hereinafter DDA], has six parts.77
The first part provides a series of twelve definitions, including
definitions for: (1) adult (a person over the age of eighteen); (2)
attending physician; (3) consulting physician (specialist in the
patient's disease); (4) counseling (the consultation of a licensed
psychiatrist or psychologist); (5) incapable (unable to commu-
nicate in person or through family members); (6) informed deci-
sion (a decision based upon the appreciation of relevant facts
after being fully informed of medical diagnosis, prognosis, po-
tential risks from the prescribed medicine, probable results of
the medicine, and feasibility of alternatives including, but not
limited to, comfort care, hospice care, and pain control); (7)
qualified patient (an Oregon adult who meets the terms of the
act); (8) physician (a physician licensed to practice in Oregon);
and (9) terminable disease (an incurable and irreversible dis-
ease that has been medically confirmed and will, within reason-
able medical judgment, produce death within six months).78
Part two states the general rule under the Act:
An adult who is capable, is a resident of Oregon, and has
been determined by the attending physician and consulting
physician to be suffering from a terminal disease, and who
has voluntarily expressed his or her wish to die, may make
a written request for medication for the purpose of ending
his or her life in a humane and dignified manner in accor-
dance with this Act. 9
Additionally, part two provides guidelines as to the form of the
written request and refers readers to section six which contains
a sample form. 0 The writing must be signed and dated by the
patient and witnessed by two individuals.81 The attending phy-
sician is not qualified to be a witness, and one of the witnesses
cannot be a relative, a person entitled to any portion of the
76. Id.
77. Death with Dignity Act, 1995 OR. LAWS Ch. 3 (I.M. 16).
78. Id. § 1.01.
79. Id. § 2.01 (emphasis added).
80. Id. § 2.02.
81. Id.
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patient's estate, or an owner, operator or employee of a health
care facility where the patient is receiving treatment.82
Part three of the DDA lists a series of protections for the
patient.83 The primary list outlines the attending physician's
responsibilities which include: (1) making the initial determina-
tion that the patient is a capable adult, that the patient made
a voluntary request, and that the patient is suffering from a
terminal disease; (2) giving the patient the necessary informa-
tion to make an informed decision; (3) referring the patient for
a medical consultation; (4) referring a patient for a psychologi-
cal consultation (if appropriate under the act); (5) requesting
that the patient notify her family; (6) informing the patient of
the opportunity to rescind the request at any time; (7) verifying
that the patient is making an informed decision before writing
the prescription; (8) fulfilling the documentation requirements;
and (9) ensuring that all steps are carried out in accordance
with the Act.8
Part three also requires that the patient make two oral re-
quests and at least one written request within the designated
time periods to comply with waiting periods set forth in the
DDA.85 To combat developing practices which shirk the proce-
dural requirements, section three also requires that the Health
Division annually review a sample of submitted records to en-
sure compliance and then prepare an annual statistical report
which is made available to the public.8
Part four makes clear that health care providers are under
no duty to participate, but they must transfer the file to anoth-
er physician if the patient requests."7 However, if they do par-
ticipate, they are protected by good faith.8 If they alter or
forge a request, conceal or destroy a rescission, or exert undue
influence on a patient, they will be guilty of a Class A felony.
These penalties do not preclude other available criminal pen-
82. Id.
83. Id. § 3.01.
84. Id. (emphasis added).
85. Id. § 3.06.
86. Id. § 3.11.
87. Id. § 4.01.
88. Id. § 4.01(2). The good faith language in this section parallels Virginia's corpo-
rate business definition of due care. VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-690 (Michie 1993).
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alties or limit civil liability resulting from negligent or inten-
tional misconduct. 9
The Oregon federal district court however, much to the sur-
prise of those trained in traditional equal protection analysis,
has rejected the state's right to provide for physician-assisted
suicide on constitutional equal protection grounds." It found
the existence of a right to terminate one's own life problematic,
along the same lines as the Ninth Circuit in Compassion in
Dying.9 The court said that it was patently absurd to think
that it would allow a forty-year-old alcoholic to be assisted in
committing suicide.2 But the court was not just answering the
question of whether there is a privacy right in committing sui-
89. Death with Dignity Act, 1995 OR. LAWS Ch. 3 (I.M. 16) § 4.02. The language
is borrowed heavily from the Netherlands experience. The Netherlands guidelines are
described in Margaret P. Battin, The Least Worst Death Essays, in BIOETHIcs ON THE
END OF LIFE 108 (1994):
1. The patient must be mentally competent and the desire for
death must be "consistent, durable, and well considered." The physician
must ensure that the a patient has a "clear picture of his medical situa-
tion and the appropriate prognosis."
2. The patient's request cannot be granted unless he/she is experi-
encing "unacceptable and hopeless suffering that cannot be rendered
bearable." By "unbearable suffering" the report means either "unbearable
physical pain" or "unbearable mental suffering as a result of a physical
disorder." The report states that given current pain-control techniques,
euthanasia is a rarely justified response to physical pain.
3. The patient need not be in the "terminal phase." Since the focus
is upon a compassionate response to unbearable and unrelievable suffer-
ing which causes the patient to prefer death to life, it is unduly restric-
tive to insist that death be at hand.
4. The physician must consult with an experienced colleague, as his
solitary judgment is not sufficient warrant to perform euthanasia.
5. Finally, if the physician has moral objections to euthanasia, he
must refer the patient to another physician.
Id. at 130.
In comparison with the Netherlands position, Oregon was much more careful.
Oregon's Act limited the choice to those diagnosed as having less than six months to
live. It required both physician and patient to be Oregon residents, and therefore
would prohibit Dr. Kevorkian from flying in to perform doctor-of-death services. It
required consultation and a psychological evaluation whenever depression was suggest-
ed. The Act also suggested family counseling and provided for explicit monitoring by
the community through review of assisted suicides and the publication of the findings.
90. Lee v. Oregon, 891 F. Supp. 1429, 1437 (D. Or. 1995); see, GUNTHER, supra
note 11, at 617-22.
91. Lee, 891 F. Supp. at 1433.
92. Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 49 F.3d 586, 590-91 (9th Cir.), reh'g
granted, 62 F.3d 299 (9th Cir. 1995) (en banc).
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cide. It was, in addition, declaring the state's legislative will
irrational, if not at least nonrational, by holding that the stat-
ute violated the federal equal protection law.
9 3
The court reached its result by manipulating classic equal
protection analysis. 4 It declared that a state could not grant a
93. Lee, 891 F. Supp. at 1437; see generally GUNTHER, supra note 11, at 624
(citing Vance v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93 (1979), for the proposition that to find a classi-
fication unconstitutional, the facts upon which a federal law was premised, requiring
retirement of Foreign Service personnel at 60 could not reasonably be conceived to be
true).
94. Lee, 891 F. Supp. at 1439-38; see generally, GUNTHER, supra note 11. Gunther
summarizes the law of equal protection and describes its manipulatability of funda-
mental value questions:
Traditionally, equal protection supported only minimal judicial in-
tervention in most contexts. Ordinarily, the command of equal protection
was only that government must not impose differences in treatment "ex-
cept upon some reasonable differentiation fairly related to the object of
regulation. . . . And usually that rational classification requirement was
readily satisfied: the courts did not demand a tight fit between classifi-
cation and purpose; perfect congruence between means and ends was not
required; judges allowed legislators flexibility to act on the basis of
broadly accurate generalizations and tolerated considerable over inclusive-
ness and under inclusiveness in classification schemes. Only in special,
limited contexts was equal protection found to have a deeper bite during
most of its history-most notably in racial discrimination cases.
From its traditional modest role, equal protection burgeoned into a
major interventionist tool during the Warren era, especially in the 1960s.
The Warren Court did not abandon the deferential ingredients of the old
equal protection: in most areas of economic and social legislation, the
demands imposed by equal protection remained minimal. . . . A sharply
differentiated two-tier approach evolved by the late 1960s: in addition to
the deferential "old" equal protection, a "new" equal protection, connoting
strict scrutiny arose: . . . The intensive review associated with the new
equal protection imposed two demands-a demand not only as to means
but also to ends. Legislation qualifying for strict scrutiny required a far
closer fit between classification and statutory purpose than the rough and
ready flexibility traditionally tolerated by the old equal protection: means
had to be shown "necessary" to achieve statutory ends, not merely "rea-
sonably related." Moreover, equal protection became a source of ends
scrutiny as well: legislation in the areas of the new equal protection had
to be justified by compelling state interests, not merely the wide spec-
trum of "legitimate" state ends.
The Warren Court identified the areas appropriate for strict scruti-
ny by searching for two characteristics: the presence of a suspect classifi-
cation; or an impact on "fundamental" rights or interests....
In more recent years, there has been neither undiminished carrying
forward nor wholesale turning back of the Warren Court approach. ...
Even while the two tier scheme has often been adhered to in form, there
has also been an increasingly noticeable resistance to the sharp difference
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right to some of its citizens if that right did not exist for every-
one.95 It found that the right then did not exist." It found, in
an interesting twist of logic, that the real right involved was a
right to be protected from physician-assisted suicide, that should
be extended to the infirm in the last six months of a terminal
illness, as well as to the forty year old or the momentarily de-
pressed." It said that to discriminate against those in the last
six months of life by demanding that they be protected from
their own request to end their life was to discriminate against
them in violation of the Constitution.98
between deferential "old" and interventionist "new" equal protection....
A number of Justices, from all segments of the Court, have sought for-
mulations that would blur the sharp distinctions of the two-tiered ap-
proach or that would narrow the gap between strict scrutiny and defer-
ential review ... But the modern Court's results indicate at least two
significant changes in equal protection law. First, invocation of the "old"
equal protection formula no longer signals, as it did with the Warren
Court, an extreme deference to legislative classifications and a virtually
automatic validation of challenged statutes. Instead, several cases, even
while voicing the minimal "rationality," "hands off' standards of the old
equal protection, proceed to find the statute unconstitutional: for the first
time in years, old equal protection standards occasionally mean some-
thing other than perfunctory opinions sustaining the law under attack.
Occasionally, moreover, reformulations of "mere rationality" standards
hint at increased bite to the scrutiny....
Equal protection is in a state of flux .... The search for coherence
in the volatile, sometimes chaotic field of equal protection, law, then is
the challenge... Value judgments underlie many of the decisions be-
low ... Yet the legitimacy of fundamental values adjudication under the
guise of equal protection is not at all clear. To say that persons who are
alike must be treated alike does not tell us how to determine whether
persons are alike or not for the purposes of the classification inherent in
virtually all legislation .... The extent to which equal protection permits
value-free, process oriented adjudication and the extent to which it inevi-
tably involves governing assumptions about underlying (albeit often unar-
ticulated) value choices, in short, is a problem to be borne in mind....
Id. at 602-08.
Needless to say, equal protection has become an easily manipulated tool for judicial
intervention into questions of fundamental values.
95. Lee, 891 F. Supp. at 1432.
96. Id. The court could instead have said that the right did exist for the state to
create, relying on the reasoning in Cruzan. See Benjamin C. Zipursky, The Pedigrees
of Rights and Powers in Scalia's Cruzan Concurrence, 56 U. PrIT. L. REV. 283, 286
(1994).
97. Lee, 891 F. Supp at 1433.
98. Id. at 1432-38.
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Of course, this reasoning is problematic because the whole
idea of equality is so easily manipulated and so empty.9
99. See Westen, supra note 4; cf Greenawalt, supra note 4; see also Rodriguez v.
British Columbia, 3 S.C.R. 519 (1993) (for an excellent discussion of physician-assisted
suicide in the context of the Canadian Charter). The dissenters in Rodriguez
(L'Houreux-Dube and McLachlin) turn the equal protection argument on its ear. They
argue:
Section 241 (b) (a Canadian Criminal code section that makes as-
sisting a crime) of the Code infringes the right to security of the person
included section 7 of the Charter. This right has an element of personal
autonomy, which protects the dignity and privacy of individuals with
respect to decisions concerning their own body. A legislative scheme
which limits the right of a person to deal with her body as she chooses
may violate the principles of fundamental justice under section 7 if the
limit is arbitrary. A particular limit will be arbitrary if it bears no rela-
tion to, or is inconsistent with, the objective that lies behind the legisla-
tion. When one is considering whether a law breaches the principles of
fundamental justice under section 7 by reason of arbitrariness, the focus
is on whether a legislative scheme infringes a particular person's protect-
ed interests in a way that cannot be justified having regard to the objec-
tive of this scheme. The principles of fundamental justice require that
each person, considered individually be treated fairly by the law. The
fear that abuse may arise if an individual is permitted that which she is
wrongly denied plays no part at the section 7 state. Any balancing of
societal interests against the interests of the individual should take place
within the confines of section 1 of the Charter. Here, parliament has put
into force a legislative scheme which makes suicide lawful but assisted
suicide unlawful. The effect of this distinction is to deny to some people
the choice of ending their lives solely because they are physically unable to
do so, preventing them from exercising the autonomy over their bodies
available to other people (my emphasis). The denial of the ability to end
their life is arbitrary and hence amounts to a limit on the right to secu-
rity of the person does not comport with the principles of fundamental
justice.
While these dissenters are adamant that they are not making an equal protec-
tion/discrimination argument under Canadian Charter section 15, their argument
could just as well be used as an equal protection response to Oregon's prohibition of
physician-assisted suicide. The Canadian dissenters reject "discrimination" analysis
because they find it unduly "deflects the equality jurisprudence from the true focus of
section 15." I believe it further points out the relative emptiness and manipulability
of equal protection analysis. Depending on how you first frame the right involved,
and who is in or out of the class, you can support a position either for or against
physician-assisted suicide.
Lets use this latter formulation of "right" and see where it leads. For example,
if we analogized the criminal statute that protects against physician-assisted suicide
to a safety regulation, like a seat belt child restraint statute, then the argument
would go that a lesser seatbelt requirement for adults than for children would violate
the adult's rights to the protection of the restraint law. If we used the Oregon court's
reasoning, either everyone is entitled to the protection of a restraint/seatbelt law, or
no one is. Of course this is absurd. Society has decided that adults need less protec-
tion than that provided to infants because they are more capable, mature, and able
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Westen explains that "equality camouflages rights under a for-
mula that makes no explicit reference to the substantive rights
it incorporates from elsewhere."0 ' . . . Equality blind[s] us not
only to the existence of such rights but to their specific sub-
stantive content also."'' Equality "compounds the problem to
subsume them under the 'catchall' proposition that 'likes should
be treated alike,' a formula that is capable of incorporating any
substantive right by reference." °2 And so the Oregon court
does not explicitly tell us what right it is referring to. Is it
referring to a right to medical treatment to relieve suffering?
What exactly is the nature of this right to physician-assisted
suicide? Is it instead a right of the patient in the last six
months to the same protections against assisted suicide that
others have under state penal codes?' 3
The problem with the equal protection analysis is that the
court errs in believing the following:
[I]f two parties are morally or legally equivalent for one
purpose, they must be morally or legally equivalent for all
purposes. To say that one person is morally or legally "like"
another in respect to some treatment is to say that, despite
the nearly infinite differences between them, the features
they share are made relevant by the particular moral or
legal rule at hand. But it does not follow that, because their
common features are made relevant by that rule, they are
also relevant under other rules. 1°4
Similarly, Oregon's law applies to everyone who is terminally
ill, with less than six months to live, regardless of age, sex, or
race. So it provides equivalent treatment in some respects. The
to decide for themselves what level of seatbelt protection they need. Just because a
certain group of people doesn't have some state protection doesn't make it prima facie
violative of equal protection. The question is whether those in the last six months
need less protection because they are more "mature" and should be allowed to decide
for themselves what protections they need. The question is whether the lessening of
protection is reasonable.
100. Westen, supra note 4, at 580.
101. Id. (footnotes omitted).
102. Id. at 581.
103. See generally Rodriguez v. British Columbia (Attorney General), 3 S.C.R. 519
(1993) (for an excellent discussion of physician-assisted suicide in the context of the
Canadian Charter); Westen, supra note 4.
104. Westen, supra note 4, at 583.
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classification is not suspect, as it would be if it were based on
race, or even sex. If the right is to the protection of the crimi-
nal law of suicide, the right is not a privacy right nor is it
fundamental. °5  Presumably strict scrutiny should not
apply.
10 6
The court uses the classification regarding six months to live
to excuse its discussion about what it finds unwise about the
statute. 107 It decides that it is unreasonable to give the ability
to get physician-assisted suicide to the terminally ill and not to
others.' Yet it ignores the middle ground, having constrained
itself by equality and its all or nothing definition of "rights."' 9
Indeed, the statute is not unreasonable for its attempt to cabin
the application of the statute to a definable class of patients
with life expectancies of less than six months. It is at least
reasonable to believe that some individuals in this situation
would have more reason to want to control their last bit of life,
and that society has a lesser interest in protecting the short life
rather than the longer one. While some individuals in this
group may be vulnerable, the issue should be how to protect
them adequately and not to deny their requests wholesale. In
any event, such an argument is at least reasonably and ratio-
105. Tort law is filled with other examples where different levels of protection are
granted individuals depending on their status. These classifications are held to be
rational. For example, a consumer of a product is protected, in many states, by strict
liability law. A consumer of medical services from a physician is protected only from
negligence. A corporate security holder is protected from misdeeds by a corporate
officer or board member by only a good faith standard. An employee is denied the
protection of suit and must recover under a worker's compensation statute. Each of
these groups is given more or less protection depending on the courts' and society's
belief that they need more or less protection. Once the reasons are understood for
why more or less protection is given to that group, then the classification passes
constitutional muster. In traditional equal protection language, the court must pre-
sume the classification reasonable.
Even if the court thought it was hard to see why employees need less protec-
tion than shareholders, than a doctor's patients, than consumers of products, the
traditional constitutional analysis would presume rationality. Different people are
treated differently because of the nature of their relationship and situation. From
these cases one would think that the question is only whether it is patently irratio-
nal that individuals in the last six months of life are more prone to the need to be
treated differently in order for their liberty to be protected.
106. See GUNTHER, supra note 11, at 603.
107. See Gerald Gunther, The New Equal Protection, 86 HARv. L. REV. 1 (1972).
108. Lee v. Oregon, 891 F. Supp. 1428, 1432-38 (D. Or. 1995).
109. See GUNTHER, supra note 11, at 579 (describing Scalia's states' rights ap-
proach to setting an evidentiary standard for finding whether a right exists).
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nally related to the purpose of being compassionate to individ-
uals in the last stages of terminal illness.
As the rights-based analysis of equal protection is too con-
cerned with the state's right to protect its citizens, it is not
possible to balance the relational, privacy and autonomy inter-
ests of the individual." In addition, at least up until most
recently, the courts did not discuss the brave new world that
patients face at the end of life.
There had been no airing of the plight of long term care
patients who face a very real fear of endless suffering and
powerlessness. It is a fact of life today that death occurs in
hospitals more often than at home or at the accident scene."'
Death is often finally the result of someone deciding to flip a
switch or withhold some technology." The timing of the deci-
sion to end life is left to the control of the institution and its
view of futility. It is at least reasonable to suspect that some
care providers may care little for the appearance of the patient,
the memories his death will invoke, the pain that he will go
through, or the financial resources of the patient and family
which will be expended on the last technological gasps. The
patient may understandably see herself as a burden-as requir-
ing the family to waste the resources to maintain her in a
painful and virtually incommunicado condition-until the mon-
ey, the pain, and the technology is cut off by someone who
neither knows her, nor really cares for her, but cares only that
the medicare check comes in payment.
What is unreasonable about an individual patient's request to
control the circumstances of death in the situation where he
has less than six months to live and few resources to waste?
The Oregon statute defines a class that reasonably has more
interest in and need for its privacy right to be protected than
110. Westen, supra note 4, at 560; see also Stephen Toulmin, The Tyranny of Prin-
ciples, 11 THE HASTINGS CENTER REP., Dec. 1981, at 31. Toulmin makes the case
that in a world of strangers, the only ethic is equality. Better, he says, to see people
in their individual relationships and give discretion to the decision-makers to deter-
mine whether equals are really equal, or whether the unique situation of the individ-
ual patient calls for different treatment. Toulmin, supra at 37-38.
111. Note, Developments in the Law: Medical Technology and the Law, 103 HARV.
L. REV. 1519 (1990) [hereinafter Medical Technology].
112. Id.
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does the forty-year-old who is depressed."' They, as a class,
have less to lose. Yet this is exactly why the legal analysis is
so unsatisfactory. Each side argues in terms of rights and clas-
sifications. Both sides take a broad rights-based regulatory
approach to the issue.
And indeed the last chapter of the Compassion in Dying had
not been written. While this article was going to press, the
Ninth Circuit, on appeal, reversed the three judge en banc
panel, and affirmed the district court decision, holding, once
again that there was a constitutionally protected liberty interest
or "right to die.""' It defined the right to die as "determining
the time and manner of one's death," and "hastening one's
death.""5 It thereby reaffirmed, as did the district court, that
withdrawal of treatment decisions are at least very similar, if
not indistinguishable from physician assisted suicide."'
Choosing its words carefully, the court began by limiting its
decision to the prescribing of medication by a physician for the
purpose of enabling a patient to end his life."' It then took a
broader historical look a suicide, finding support for suicide in
the examples and reactions to suicide in the Greeks (including
Socrates and Plato), Stoics, and Romans."' While admitting
that Christianity outlawed suicide for 1000 years, it again
found support for the moral act of suicide in the writings of
Voltaire, Diderot, Francis Bacon, David Hume, John Donne, and
Sir Thomas Moore."' It also found support in polls, including
a 1990 Roper poll that found 64% of Americans believed that
the terminally ill should have the right to request and receive
physician aid in dying, another national poll in 1991 that
showed that nearly two thirds of Americans favored doctor-
assisted suicide, and a 1994 Harris poll that found 73% of
Americans favored legalizing physician-suicide. 2 '
113. Death with dignity Act, 1995 OR. LAWS Ch. 3 (I.M. 16).
114. Compassion in Dying v. Washington, No. 94-35534, 1996 WL 94848 (9th Cir.
Mar. 6, 1996) (en banc).
115. Id. at *9.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id. at *13-16.
119. Id.
120. Id. at *16.
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The Ninth Circuit also returned to Casey and Cruzan to find
a liberty interest in the right to die." It chose a due process
analysis, rather than an equal protection analysis.1 2 It re-
fused to apply the two-tiered or three-tiered due process analy-
sis.' It simply argued that it must balance the states inter-
est against the right it found to exist.' The state's interest it
found to be in six regards: 1) preserving life; 2) preventing sui-
cide; 3) avoiding the involvement of third parties; precluding
the use of arbitrary, unfair, or undue influence; 4) preventing
the effects on children, other family members, and loved ones;
5) protecting the integrity of the medical profession; and 6) pre-
venting a deterioration of the view of life in society by opening
"a pandora's box."' Yet it found that each one of these state
interests was overcome by a person's liberty right in preventing
suffering and choosing the circumstances of their dying." It
found the strength of the liberty interest to depend on the indi-
vidual circumstances of the patient.' If the person was ter-
minally ill and suffering then it found the person's interest to
be stronger than the state's. The court then measured the bur-
dens of a total ban on physician-assisted suicide to be too
great.M
It concluded by stating that the Oregon district court was
simply wrong in that what Oregon saw as a benefit (and a
needed protection), the Ninth Circuit saw as an unconstitution-




125. Id. at *21-33.
126. Id. at *35-38.
127. Id. at *35. In the court's words:
We noted that an individual's liberty interest in hastening his death is
at it low point when that person is young and healthy, because forcing a
robust individual to continue living does not , at least absent extraor-
dinary circumstances, subject him to "pain... [and] suffering that is too
intimate and personal for the State to insist on. .. ." Casey, 112 S.Ct. at
2807. As we also made clear, when a mentally competent adult is termi-
nally ill, and wishes free of any coercion, to hasten his death because re-
maining days are an unmitigated torture, that person's liberty interest is
at its height. For such a person, being forced to live is indeed being
subjected to "pain ... [and] suffering that is too intimate and personal
for the State to insist on...."
128. Id.
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al burden on the right to die. The Ninth Circuit held that the
Lee was clearly in error, was not helpful and was directly con-
trary to their holding.'29 One wonders then whether the effect
of the Ninth circuit's opinion is that it revives the Oregon state
statute.
This due process balancing analysis again came up with a
one answer fits all solution. It declared those portions of the
state of Washington's criminal statute that violated the
patient's right to die as being unconstitutional. Of course the
following uncertainty is whether individual doctors who assist a
suicide might still be subject to prosecution where the individu-
al circumstances would allow the state to step in and protect
the individual from a biased or blameworthy decision to help
terminate life. On its face however, the case seems to stand for
the proposition that everyone has some right to die with physi-
cian assistance. The extent of that right, and the extent to
which the state can limit that right, is not specified.
The court recognized the uncertainty its ruling would cause.
It seemed to being inviting more cases to come before it so that
it could develop, through common law, guidance on the is-
sue. 3' It saw, however, a number of side benefits to their ap-
proach. The court argued that its decision would eventually
remove the issue from the courts and leave it for individual
determinations about what should be done. It invited society as
a whole to study the issue and contribute to its solution. It
predicted that discussing this issue in the light of the Constitu-
tion would engender respect for the Constitution.'
The difficulty with the Constitutional rights-based analysis is
that it leaves the court ill equipped to do the individualized
balancing act it recognizes is required. How will the court mea-
sure the good faith of the care providers who are involved with
the patient? Rights analysis also doesn't give direction as to
what role patient depression might play in causing an individu-
al patient to make a bad determination about their suffering
and their future quality of life. The rights language simply
leaves the society with a language of argument, "I have a
129. Id. at *38.
130. Id. at *39.
131. Id.
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right." "No you don't." "Yes I do." "No you don't." There is no
frame work for insuring that a caring, good faith discussion will
be had with the patient. Neither is there provision made or
assurance given that society's long range concerns regarding the
sanctity of live will be continually considered.
If rights language takes an objective "one answer fits all"
approach to legal problems, it is motivated by a proper concern,
that the law ought to be universal. It is also accurate for soci-
ety to fear that if the law does take a "one answer fits all"
approach to providing a right to suicide, that the institutions
and care providers might encourage suicide for the sick, op-
pressed, disabled, and unpopular in society. The courts also are
right to deal as little as they can with questions of motives and
individual circumstances because they know that proof of mo-
tive is very difficult, and a flood of litigation can often follow.
As every physician knows, even a legal analysis where motive,
individual circumstance, and balancing are part of the condi-
tions for deciding when treatment can be withdrawn or with-
held, the physician or other assistor may be in a risky position.
Out of fear that they may be accused of a criminal act, these
potential assistors stay away from acts which could be con-
strued as the results of improper motives or bias against the
patient. Thus, the law either then deters assistors too broadly
or encourages them too much. In any event, so goes the debate
using traditional rights-based analysis that attempts a court
processed solution.132 Yet the argument here is meant to be
132. See, GUNTHER, supra note 11 and accompanying text. Traditional bioethics is
also of little help. Its four principles of autonomy, nonmaleficence, beneficence and
justice lean in opposite directions. While the principle of autonomy suggests that we
do whatever the patient freely chooses, autonomy also flounders on the informed
choice that is necessary in order for autonomy to work. Beneficence also flounders on
the definition of the good. The physician says that he or she must heal and fight
disease to do good. The patient says that he is held captive by the physician and
doing good means releasing the captive and making choice available.
Related, of course, is the principle of nonmaleficence, or doing no harm. Here
the arguments revolve around definitions of suffering. One side argues that killing is
the ultimate harm, the other that suffering and loss of dignity is worse. The principle
that one does no harm tries to measure future affects of individual decisions. If the
patient is temporarily depressed, or subtly encouraged into committing suicide when
they otherwise would not, and would otherwise live a long and happy life, then the
physician is causing harm to these people by confirming that they should give up and
helping them do so. On the other hand, if a person would suffer immeasurably for
longer periods than if they could end the suffering with dignity, then more harm is
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more than a "foot stomping" statement that physician-assisted
suicide is a right and is reasonable at times. The better, deeper
issue is whether society can balance the state interest in pro-
tecting its citizens with a dying patient's interest in dignity.
Professor Carl Schneider captures the problem of traditional
bioethical rights-based analysis and directs our attention toward
the ethics of care. Schneider contends that "a powerfully stated
and too-often simple autonomy paradigm has become the cen-
tral feature of bioethical thought and law. Yet, despite the
undoubted and true importance of that paradigm, its reiteration
has become stale, flat, and unprofitable, and its simplicities
have become too costly.""' He argues that the courts have be-
caused by denying the patient request. The question, then, is how can the physician
be sure that a person not terminally ill or in a persistent vegetative state really
wants to end life? In withdrawal situations, we already know that everyone has vig-
orously tried to save the life. The life support systems evidence that. There then is
no subtle message being sent to the person that "we want you to give up, because
you're not worth saving." We also send the message that the decision will be made
after there has been a calm discussion with the surrogate or a careful examination of
the living will and after there has been agreement by the medical providers that the
person is in a terminal condition (with a life expectancy less than six months when
off the artificial life support).
Issues of justice are the most complex. If we do assume a world of scarce re-
sources, then dollars spent on patients who don't want help are better spent on pa-
tients who want to get better and live productive lives. Money spent on food, cloth-
ing, and housing, as well as prenatal care and preventive care, would be dollars
better spent than spent on long, expensive medical care for someone who doesn't
want it, has given up, and insists on dying. The debate flounders on the
immeasurability of the suffering and value of life of an individual, the inability to
measure whether the individual is making an authentic choice, and the inability to
make a blanket justice determination.
The language of justice arguably leads to a utilitarian analysis. Of course, all
of the criticism of utility is applicable. Who is to say what is better? How will we
know what is better? Who defines the good? Yet nonconsequentialist analysis is no
better. See Toulmin, supra note 110.
133. Carl E. Schneider, Bioethics with a Human Face, 69 IND. L.J. 1075, 1076
(1994).
'[The rationalist] does not neglect experience, but he often appears to do
so because . . . of the rapidity with which he reduces the tangle and
variety of experience to a set of principles which he will then attack or
defend only upon rational grounds. He has no sense of the cumulation of
experience, only of the readiness of experience when it has been convert-
ed into a formula. .. ."
Id. at 1077 n.7 (quoting MICHAEL OAKESHOn", RATIONALISM IN POLITICS, AND OTHER
ESSAYS (1962)).
"[O]rdered, cerebral armchair inquiry is given precedence, partly because
the formalistic "data" it generates more closely fit the norms of bioethical
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come hyper-rationalists on the theory that the best decisions
are made objectively and in a cold and dispassionate man-
ner."M That is, the particular emotions and feelings of the in-
dividuals involved will only muck up the process and lead to
bad decisions. Schneider instead argues, to the contrary:
Hyper-rationalism's substantive assumptions could be true,
but that has hardly been demonstrated. And they are much
likelier to be false. Their picture of human nature is far too
simple, far too disembodied to be convincing. They present a
bloodless, flat, distant, abstract, depersonalized, impover-
ished view of the way people think, feel, and act, of the
social circumstances in which people live, of the ethical
lives they lead. And hyper-rationalism's simplifications are
particularly injurious in bioethics, a field that treats people
in their least rational moments, in their most emotional
travails, in their most contextual complexity. 5
In other words, the courts simply miss the real issue. The issue
is not one of rights. The issue is whether, taking the patient in
the context of his relationships, his decision to commit suicide
ought to be honored.
II. THE CARE PERSPECTIVE
What exactly then is a "care perspective," and what are its
benefits?... The language of the care perspective is still evolv-
logic and rationality than information gathered through first-hand re-
search. Thought experiments are one of an array of cognitive techniques
used in bioethics to distance and abstract itself from the human settings
in which ethical questions are embedded and experienced, reduce their
complexity and ambiguity, limit the number and kinds of morally rele-
vant factors to be dealt with, dispel dilemmas, and siphon off the emo-
tion, suffering, bewilderment, and tragedy that many medical moral pre-
dicaments entail for patients, families, and medical professionals."
Id. at 1077-78 (quoting Renee C. Fox & Judith P. Swazey, Medical Morality Is not
Bioethics, in ESSAYS IN MEDICAL SOcIOLOGY 645, 666 (1988)).
134. Id. at 1076-80.
135. Id. at 1080.
136. See Ann Hamric, Using the Care Perspective in Case Analysis (article in
preparation); Donald P. Judges, Taking Care Seriously: Relational Feminism, Sexual
Difference, and Abortion, 73 N.C. L. REV. 1323, 1390 (1995). Judges writes:
Noddings argues that moral philosophy's reliance on traditional Kantian
criteria of universality and objectivity "has led to a serious imbalance in
moral discussion." The universals of Noddings's ethic are attitudinal and
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 30:199
ing and is admittedly fuzzy. The best description comes from
Alisa Carse. Carse says:
According to Gilligan, the justice orientation construes the
moral point of view as an impartial point of view, under-
stands particular moral judgments as derived from abstract
and universal principles, sees moral judgment as essentially
dispassionate rather than passionate, and emphasizes indi-
vidual rights and norms of formal equality and reciprocity
in modelling our moral relationships. By contrast, the care
orientation rejects impartiality as an essential mark of the
moral, understands moral judgments as situation-attuned
perceptions sensitive to others' needs and to the dynamics
of particular relationships, construes moral reasoning as
involving empathy and concern, and emphasizes norms of
motivational rather than behavioral: "[A]n ethic of caring locates morality
in the pre-act consciousness" of the one who cares. Caring and related-
ness thus are desirable ends in themselves; caring is not an obligation
that one must discharge to achieve morality. To the contrary, "[wie want
to be moral in order to remain in the caring relation and to enhance the
ideal of ourselves" as persons who care. Morality under this view derives
from a natural desire to become and to remain related, which gradually
unfolds in a succession of caring relations. Such relations allow "identity-
conferring commitments," that: reveal personal integrity; provide the
sense that one's life has meaning, foundation, and a place in the commu-
nity; and elicit the values of patience, trust, and a moderation of manip-
ulative striving.
While the caring relation is the ethical ideal, even when the em-
pathic connection is strong and a motivation to act naturally arises the
individual can choose whether to accept and act upon or to reject that
feeling. Furthermore, in some personal encounters such sentiments either
do not arise naturally at all or do so only faintly and are displaced by
other feelings such as hostility or revulsion. In such cases, an individual
may summon motivation from remembrance of his or her own natural
caring and being cared for, to take care of his or her ethical self.
Noddings refers to this process as "ethical caring."
An ethic of care thus "is a natural derivative of the desire to be
related. It springs from our experience of caring and the inevitable as-
sessment of this relation as 'good'. What we seek in caring is not pay-
ment or reciprocity in kind but the special reciprocity that connotes com-
pletion." This ethic of care leads to self-flfillment; it does not require
self-sacrifice on the altar of abstract altruistic ideal. Moreover, the roles
of caring and being cared for are neither static nor predetermined, but
shift over time and between persons.
A caring attitude is not enough, though; there must be connection.
Id. at 1389-92 (footnotes omitted).
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responsiveness and responsibility in our relationships with
others. 7
How, then, would a process that is created from a care per-
spective be initiated, what would it look like, and how would
such a process resist the constraints that arise from the role-
playing hierarchical model, where the physician, or judge, or
even the individual patient has been given the right to make
the decision? First the care perspective should be initiated, as it
is now, with a request from the patient to the treating physi-
cian. The patient's request and the physician's decision to pre-
scribe the medication then place the physician in the role of
initiator of the caring discussion. There should be no coercion
on the part of the physician. If the physician does not want to
be involved, she should recommend another physician who is
willing to be involved. Once a physician is found willing to
initiate the process, the physician should engage in building a
consensus decision-making process as follows.'38
First, the professional care provider should gather informa-
tion and identify which factors are relevant to the analysis.
This requirement goes beyond the usual rights-based methodol-
ogy in requiring the identification of salient features of the
context as well as the individual's perceptions of the events.
Key to resisting the role-playing involved in most problem-
solving models would be for the professional to instead initially
serve in the role as "listener."'39 A "listener" recognizes that
moral persuasion can best occur only after a person has been
understood.' The need for true understanding as a threshold
for any connectedness or caring is best described in the work of
psychiatrist Tom Rusk. He writes:
137. Carse, supra note 10, at 5-6.
138. See Hamric, supra note 136.
139. We were first introduced to the role of "listener" by Maude Pervere and
Janeen Kerper at a planning conference held by the National Institute for Trial Advo-
cacy for the development of a new program for lawyers to reimagine the lawyer-client
relationship. Pervere and Kerper then referred us to TOM RUSK, TIE POWER OF ETHI-
CAL PERSUASION: FROm CONFLICT TO PARTNERSHIP AT WORK AND IN PRIVATE LIFE
(1993).
140. Id. at 67-70.
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It's mysterious and ironic that after millions of years of
evolution-and a hundred or so of modern psychological
theorizing and research-we human beings have not ad-
vanced very far in person-to-person communications. We can
generally exchange thoughts and ideas pretty well, but
nonetheless we often fail to understand each other. For the
most part, what we fail to communicate clearly is our feel-
ings, those nonverbal, deeply rooted energies that can lead
us to act in contradiction to our will and our rational deci-
sions. Between people, strong feelings can easily escalate a
simple misunderstanding into a senseless battle of wills.
Even wars between nations have begun that way.
Modern psychology has done relatively little to help us
comprehend our feelings, or learn to manage them in accor-
dance with the fundamental values of respect, understand-
ing, caring, and fairness in order to create happier, more
fulfiling lives. Many successful books on communication
strategies have sought to teach people how to expedite prob-
lem solving or gain the upper hand in all kinds of negoti-
ations. But these strategies almost always ignore the power
of feelings in all kinds of relationships, and the need to
uphold explicit social values in the conduct of human com-
munication.
As far as I'm concerned, there never was or will be a
better basic communication strategy than the Golden Rule:
Do unto others as you would have them do unto you. Ethical
Persuasion is a practical, strategic method of applying the
Golden Rule to every kind of important communication-not
as a means of merely doing a "good deed," but as a means
of giving everyone a fair hearing, creating the optimal solu-
tions for thorny problems, and fostering long-term, trusting
relationships."
Rusk's listening techniques then correspond with the values
that Noddings and Carse describe in the ethic of care. Rusk's
"Ethical Persuasion" is the practical "how to" for the moral
philosophy of care. Rusk describes the following seven steps to
good listening:
1. Establish that your immediate goal is mutual under-
standing, not problem solving.
141. Id. at 7-8 (footnote omitted).
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2. Elicit the other person's thoughts, feelings, and desires
about the subject at hand.
3. Ask for the other person's help in understanding him
or her. Try not to defend or disagree.
4. Repeat the other person's position in your own words
to show you understand.
5. Ask the other person to correct your understanding
and keep restating his or her position.
6. Refer back to your position only to keep things going.
7. Repeat steps 1 through 6 until the other person unre-
servedly agrees that you understand his or her position.'
Listening is a key to understanding, and understanding is a
key to caring. Listening should be done first because it will
help break the care-provider out of the problem-solving role
playing. It establishes the care-provider in the learning mode
first, as opposed to the doing mode. It subverts what the care
provider knows about what the law says is legal to what the
patient knows and feels. In addition, to the extent that infor-
mation is power, the listener has the advantage of knowing
both sides (his and the patient's) before speaking. Listening
earns the listener the leverage of fairness. The more the patient
is listened to and understood, the more the patient will likely
listen and seek understanding. Finally, these seven steps culti-
vate in the listener patience and openness, qualities that evince
respect.'
After engaging in a controlled listening stage the counselor
would next identify the persons involved in interdependent
relationships, if they have not already been identified. For the
medical practitioner this step disallows a narrow focus on the
patient. All persons who are in significant relationships with
the one cared for are to be considered.'"
The next step is the most radical. The care perspective iden-
tifies the central issue of care, asking what caring demands in
this particular situation with these particular persons to
strengthen (or at least maintain) the primary relationships and
142. Id. at 70-71.
143. Id. at 63-70.
144. See Hamric, supra note 136; Ann Hamric & Paul Zwier, The Ethics of Care
and Reimagining the Lawyer-Client Relationship, _ J. Contemp. L. - (1996) (forth-
coming).
1996]
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 30:199
to avoid hurt and harm. This step can be taken only after iden-
tifying the interdependent parties and the primary relation-
ships. One then must consider the view of both the one cared
for (in the medical context, the patient) and the one caring."
Again, this stage can be broken into some concrete steps that
the care-provider could take to ensure that he is acting out of
care. Rusk describes these as follows:
1. Ask for a fair hearing in return.
2. Begin with an explanation of how the other person's
thoughts and feelings affect you. Avoid blaming and self-
defense as much as possible.
3. Carefully explain your thoughts, desires, and feelings
as your truth, not the truth.
4. Ask for restatements of your position-and corrections
of any factual inaccuracies-as necessary.
5. Review your respective positions."
The above steps in this stage of caring need to be used to
draw out each person in a significant relationship with the
patient. It provides for the subjectivity that caring requires. It
allows for the moral self to express itself. It necessitates a true
understanding reflection of the feelings of others, without desig-
nating to one or the other the moral responsibility for the deci-
sion.
In Phase Three, the care providers and the one cared for
should discuss and think through all possible alternative activi-
ties to determine which are responsible (i.e. loving and just) to
those who are involved in the situation. They should ask how
the action will affect each person's life, including their shared
life together. The view of the treating physician arises from this
attempt to enter and understand the context of the situation.
The counselor enters the situation as a caring participant. The
counselor's view is to be communicated to and carefully consid-
ered by the parties involved. Again, any actions proposed and
consequences of proposed alternatives are evaluated in terms of
whether they are loving and just for the individuals and their
shared life. 47
145. RUSK, supra note 139, at 87-100.
146. Id. at 89.
147. Id. at 107-21. Again Rusk has three steps to creating resolutions. They are:
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Finally, the involved parties should jointly select an alterna-
tive from those deemed acceptable, anticipate objections and
answer them, and devise a workable plan for carrying out the
proposed solution.'
Using this care perspective and these procedural steps, con-
sider what would most likely happen in the physician-assisted
suicide situation. The care counselor will very quickly and di-
rectly involve all the family members. There would need to be a
joint meeting with the patient, the client's other siblings and
friends, the medical practitioner, and anyone else who might
have a strong caring interest.'
The result is that the "do it/don't do it" dichotomy may im-
mediately be broken. The possible solutions multiply greatly
1. Affirm your mutual understanding and confirm that you are
both ready to consider options for resolution.
2. Brainstorm multiple options.
3. If a mutually agreeable solution is not yet obvious, try one or
more of the following options:
n Take time out to reconsider, consult, exchange proposals,
and reconvene.
* Agree to neutral arbitration, mediation, or counseling.
* Compromise between alternate solutions.
* Take turns between alternate solutions.
* Yield (for now) once your position is thoroughly and re-
spectfully considered.
M Assert your positional power after thoroughly and respect-
filly considering their position.
n Agree to disagree and still respect each other; then, if you
can, go your separate ways on the particular issue.
Id. at 108.
148. Id. at 114-21. As a possible final step, the counselor might consider drafting
an agreement which memorializes the solutions the parties reach. Yet such a process
suggests bargaining over the rights and duties of the parties. The ethics of care does
not consider bargaining a useful tool. See Annette Baier, Trust and Antitrust, 96
ETHICs 231, 248-53 (1986) (criticizing contractarians because they ignore the costs to
relationships from adversarial self-interested bargaining).
149. Of course, the lawyer could argue that the court process would eventually sort
this out when it considers issues of standing and when evidence is presented about
the competence of the patient, but the ethics of care requires that the lawyer/coun-
selor becomes a more active participant in the case in light of the demand of caring.
Principled ethicists might argue that what is really going on here is a negotiation of
who will be the primary decision-maker to solve the problem. The ethics of care per-
spective instead does not designate a primary counselor, but allows the counselor, as
one of the care providers, to focus on both the legal and medical needs and the rela-
tionship needs. The client will be replaced by a group of caring decision-makers. See
RUSK, supra note 139 and accompanying text.
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when the focus turns to what will create, maintain or maximize
the healthy relationships already present in the situation. At
the same time, care would not automatically rule physician-
assisted suicide out of bounds. The role of care-providers more
likely will force the asking of tough questions. Who cares about
the patient? What does caring demand? Where do these individ-
uals live? What is each party's capacity to care? What is fair
for each to contribute? Depending on the answers to these ques-
tions, the counselor and decision-makers can cut through the
adversarial rights-based analysis and frame a more tailored,
particularized solution. If however, the caring thing to do is to
prevent suffering and allow physician-assisted suicide, then so
be it.
Yet how can caring ever produce the option to assist in sui-
cide? It seldom should. Yet it is because caring denies neither
the inevitability of death nor the existence of suffering that is
not solely physical that the individual's request should be con-
sidered. Eric Cassel's article entitled The Nature of Suffering
and the Goals of Medicine, makes the case for caring. He writes
about the case of a woman at the end of her life:
Three facts stand out: The first is that this woman's
suffering was not confined to her physical symptoms. The
second is that she suffered not only from her disease but
also from its treatment. The third is that one could not
anticipate what she would describe as a source of suffering;
like other patients, she had to be asked. Some features of
her condition she would call painful, upsetting, uncomfort-
able, and distressing, but not a source of suffering. In these
characteristics her case was ordinary.
The relief of suffering, it would appear, is considered one
of the primary ends of medicine by patients and lay per-
sons, but not by the medical profession. As in the care of
the dying, patients and their friends and families do not
make a distinction between physical and nonphysical sourc-
es of suffering in the same way that doctors do.
This phenomenon reflects a historically constrained and
currently inadequate view of the ends of medicine.
Medicine's traditional concern primarily for the body and
for physical disease is well known, as are the widespread
effects of the mind-body dichotomy on medical theory and
practice. I believe that this dichotomy itself is a source of
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paradadoxical situations in which doctors cause suffering in
their care of the sick. Today, as ideas about the separation
of mind and body are called into question, physicians are
concerning themselves with new aspects of the human con-
dition. The profession of medicine is being pushed and
pulled into new areas, both by its technology and by the de-
mands of patients. Attempting to understand what suffering
is and how physicians might truly be devoted to its relief
will require that medicine and its critics overcome the di-
chotomy between mind and body and the associated dichoto-
mies between subjective and objective and between person
and object.
I am going to make three points. The first is that suffer-
ing is experienced by persons. In the separation between
mind and body, the concept of the person, or personhood,
has been associated with that of mind, spirit, and the sub-
jective. However, as I will show, a person is not merely
mind, merely spiritual, or only subjectively knowable.
Personhood has many facets, and it is ignorance of them
that actively contributes to patients' suffering. The under-
standing of the place of the person in human illness re-
quires a rejection of the historical dualism of mind and
body.
The second point derives from my interpretation of clini-
cal observations: Suffering occurs when an impending de-
struction of the person is perceived; it continues until the
threat of disintegration has passed or until the integrity of
the person can be restored in some other manner. It follows
then, that although suffering often occurs in the presence of
acute pain, shortness of breath, or other bodily symptoms,
suffering extends beyond the physical. Most generally,
suffering can be defined as the state of severe distress asso-
ciated with events that threaten the intactness of the
person.
The third point is that suffering can occur in relation to
any aspect of the person, whether it is in the realm of so-
cial roles, group identification, the relation with self, body,
or family, or the relation with a transpersonal, transcendent
source of meaning."
150. Eric J. Cassel, The Nature of Suffering and the Goals of Medicine, 306 NEw
ENG. J. MED. 639, 640 (1982).
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If suffering is related to the intactness of a person, and can
occur in relation to any aspect of the person including his or
her social, family and religious setting, then caring could end in
acting to relieve this suffering in certain circumstances. The
caring thing to do could be to permit a loving end to life as a
necessary response to the suffering a particular person is expe-
riencing.
III. LEGISLATING CARING
There are at least two difficulties that spring to mind that
the care perspective presents. First, can such a listening and
caring process be legislated? I am not thinking here about
whether the statute that provides for a care perspective can
withstand equal protection analysis. The answer to that ques-
tion is that caring is reasonable, even though it may not be
hyper-rational, and should be able to withstand equal protection
analysis. It also seems to me that drawing a line at six months
from the end of life is a reasonable classification analogous to
voting or drinking age restrictions. In this case, the restriction
is measured from the end of life rather than from the begin-
ning. But even if these arguments are not successful, and the
court is right that a six-month-from-the-end-of-life classification
is unreasonable, then I would instead argue for a broader care
approach, that any adult could be assisted in suicide if it is the
"caring" thing to do. In other words, I mean to ask here wheth-
er you can adequately ensure that a group that will truly listen
and care for the patient will be formed. A second difficulty is
whether a legislative scheme based on care will adequately
protect against decision-making bias and paralysis.
A return look at the Oregon statute may be helpful to an-
swer these questions. The Oregon statute can be refined and
edited using the care perspective, to create the framework nec-
essary to a workable process. The Oregon statute already has a
number of caring attributes. It tries to ensure that the treating
physician will take the time to listen and "care" by requiring:
(1) residency of both physician and patient, (which should help
protect against "doctors of death" who fly in for terminations);
(2) consultation with a specialist in the field of the patient's
disease (which fits care's demands that salient medical circum-
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stances be gathered); (3) consultation with a licensed psycholo-
gist or psychiatrist where warranted (to help in determining
whether the patient has a treatable psychological condition, and
to engage the group in a caring consultation); (4) consultation
with the family, unless the patient declines or can't reach them
(to break the patient out of his or her isolation); (5) repeated
requests (to make sure the depression is not momentary); (6)
advice that the request can be withdrawn at any time; and (7)
reporting of actions to an agency for public dissemination (to
monitor decisions to reassess caring).''
I suggest a few changes in order to make sure that the car-
ing conversation will actually occur. First, I would suggest that
a provision require that the patient and physician meet with
the family. In addition, I would require that the group meeting
also be attended by all those individuals who are in significant
relationships with the patient. Some decisions should just not
be left to an individual, or even to two or three, in isolation.
Just as we require boards of directors to meet when deciding
important corporate business decisions, the patient's "board of
directors" ought to gather to ensure that a comprehensive con-
versation occurs.
Additionally, contrary to the Oregon DDA, members of the
care-provider team should be included in attendance. While
long-term health care facilities under the Oregon statute desig-
nate witnesses having the qualifications specified by the De-
partment of Human Resources,'52 there is otherwise no explic-
it role that they play. These care-providers should be involved
more than just as witnesses because they often bring more
information about the manner of suffering experienced by the
patient. In addition, while their position should not control, it
should matter, so that the caring may involve the persons who
presently and continuously know and care for the patient. Care
demands that their subjective perspective be considered because
making them subjective participants in the process invests
them with a role in a caring decision. Excluding them or pre-
tending their objectivity may lead to greater isolation of the
patient, rather than less isolation.'53 As opposed to being pro-
151. See supra notes 75-88 and accompanying text.
152. Death with Dignity Act, 1995 OR. LAWs Ch. 3 (I.M. 16) § 2.02.
153. See Flick, supra note 1. In arguing for greater involvement, or paternalism of
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tected from institutional bias, the patient ought to hear the
concerns of the care-providers just as they hear the concerns of
family and close friends.
I envision something like the non-adversarial "IEP meeting,"
attempted between school, social worker, parent and child in
questions of special education."M Under my view, only the pa-
tient could initiate a meeting, only after he or she had met the
informed consent provisions of the DDA. Yet, while the patient
initiates the process and needs to make an informed decision to
initiate it, the group needs to take a role in defining caring op-
tions and group makeup. The patient would provide the most
important information concerning who is in a significant rela-
tionship with the patient. Yet the care-provider should inquire
of these others whether there are yet others who should be in
attendance, until a complete caring group has been agreed
upon.
I would also mandate involvement of a licensed psychologist
or psychiatrist, not just for their expertise in psychology, but
also to facilitate a caring conversation in the group. She should
help the group focus on listening to and caring for the patient.
Facilitated caring conversation needs to be part of the process,
and the psychologist or psychiatrist usually is trained in con-
the doctor, Flick writes:
What is left when autonomy is a fiction and paternalism a tyranny is a
responsibility to care and to take the risks care engenders. This is the
soul of medicine's legitimate task. "People are idiots." They need to be
protected against themselves, and others, because people do not always
know or choose the possibility they ought to prefer. The underlying theo-
ry is human fallibility and finitude. This theory is an insult to human
dignity only if the contrary assumptions-that people are infallible and
immortal-are correct. The conviction that a modest theory of humanity
is correct is the very foundation of both law and medicine. It is what
judgment and care are all about.
Id. at 1149-50 (footnotes omitted).
"[I]magine a society in which everyone agreed that in particular situations or
states of mind, everyone was likely to make mistakes and needed to be protected
from themselves. The category of paternalism might come up mainly with strong
positive connotations of loving care for others." Id. at 1167 n.106. I agree that the
doctor should care. I disagree that we should leave it at that.
154. See KATHE KLARE & THOMAS GUERNSEY, SPECIAL EDUCATION LAw 91 (1993).
Any change in a child's IEP (Individualized Educational Program) involves the agree-
ment of school and parents. Though it often turns adversarial, the process as drafted
was an attempt to insure that the various individuals who are in a relationship with
the child act together for the best interests of the child.
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ducting such a conversation. If there is any doubt about the
ability of a psychologist or psychiatrist to conduct a group like
the one described above, her training could be administered
through the state department of health or made part of the li-
censing process for these professionals.
Yet what if everyone is not able to attend? Or what if every-
one cannot agree? Then the answer the statute should provide
is that physician-assisted suicide should not be allowed. More
conversation would need to take place so that a consensus can
be reached. The result is a very conservative decision-making
process that puts the prescribing physician at risk unless there
is informed agreement by all of the caring group's members.
The physician should not prescribe unless a consensus is
reached by the group.
Yet what if no one cares; who protects the patient? Then the
physician, consulting physician, psychologist and psychiatrist,
become the care-providers and must open themselves up to
understanding and listening to the patient. If the care-providers
and patient reach a consensus, then they must do the caring
thing. The smaller the group and the less input from those who
are in relationship with the patient, the more at risk the physi-
cian would be. If the physician does not identify those in signif-
icant relationships with the patient, the prescribing physician
risks the second-guessing of his or her decision to prescribe.
As to the second concern, that the ethics of care leads to
deadlock, note instead what studies concerning the motivation
of those who have attempted or contemplated suicides sug-
gest. 5 What these studies suggest is that the request for sui-
155. See Marzen supra note 14, at 107-20. Marzen cites studies on the psychology
of those who attempt suicide. The authors reach the opposite conclusion, that is, that
since suicides are so "treatable" we should not allow their request. I argue that to
deny the request outright does not open the physician up to the kind of listening
that suicide counselors argue is necessary. See Kate E. Bloch, Note, The Role of Law
in Suicide Prevention: Beyond Civil Commitment-A Bystander Duty to Report Suicide
Threats, 39 STAN. L. REV. 929 (1987).
The question could certainly be asked whether or not changing the Oregon stat-
utory scheme to require that a psychiatrist or psychologist be involved does not al-
ready ensure sufficient protection for the authenticity of the patient's request. After
all, why not make the psychiatrist or psychologist evaluate the patient's decision-mak-
ing ability like they do with questions of competency in commitment hearings and
make them responsible for getting informed consent to the patient's decision? And,
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cide signals a bipolar hopelessness and isolation. The patient
needs to be given the opportunity to become reconnected to his
or her significant other. One study estimates that seventy-five
percent of patients who attempted suicide were really ambiv-
alent in their suicide motivation.156  As Professor Erwin
Stengel, one of the most famous to have studied suicide motiva-
tions, stated:
Many suicidal attempts and quite a few suicides are carried
out in the mood "I don't care whether I live or die," rather
than with a clear and unambiguous determination to end
life. A person who denies, after what seems an obvious
suicidal attempt, that he really wanted to kill himself, may
be telling the truth. Most people, in committing a suicidal
indeed, most studies of suicide support the position that a person seeking a suicide is
likely suffering from a mental disorder that the psychiatrist or psychologist could help
treat. Yet there are a number of responses to the legal position that require the psy-
chiatrist to "diagnose" whether the suicide interest is authentic. First, the state of
knowledge about the "rationality" of committing suicide is not clear. See Marzen,
supra note 14, at 150-53. The question whether suicide is a courageous act of self-
sacrifice or a weak, faithless response to the false hopelessness of a person's situation
has divided philosophers for centuries. Second, the very notion of hopelessness, which
is a very important factor in the suicide's decision, becomes more and more rational
with a medical diagnosis that they do not have long to live. Third, competency with
respect to a request to end life cannot be subjected to an easy psychological evalua-
tion. The very definition of depression, that someone is not "future-looking," and suf-
fers from prolonged feelings of hopelessness, begs the question of whether they may
be rational in hopelessness.
On the other hand, some studies show there is a close association between
suicidal intent and mental disorder that can not be underestimated. These studies
estimate that at least 90% of patients who desire death during a terminal illness
suffer from a treatable mental illness, usually a depressive condition.
In addition, while the request to commit suicide may be reasonable, it may be
related to untreated pain. Therefore the involvement of both the treating physician
and the psychiatrist is necessary. It follows that there are patients who suffer from
undetectable mental illness who need protection from misdiagnosis of the physician
and institutional care-provider.
Yet it is also important to recognize that the institutional care-provider, includ-
ing the psychiatrist, may also be biased in a way that overstates the irrationality
and treatability of the patient's condition. There are enormous economic benefits to
the medical profession in end-of-life heroic measures. Intensive care and other end-of-
life treatment is enormously costly, and supports the huge capital outlays in expen-
sive facilities and equipment. This cost is very real, and continues to grow as technol-
ogy becomes more and more available to prolong life far beyond any meaningful rela-
tionships that can exist between the patient and his or her significant other. See
Brian Pollard, Australia: Protection, Choice and the Common Good, AGE (MELBOURNE),
Apr. 10, 1995, at 13.
156. ERWIN STENGEL, SUICIDE AND ATTEMPTED SUICIDE 71 (1964).
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act, are just as muddled as they are whenever they do
anything of importance under emotional stress. A study by
two psychiatrists in Seattle, Washington of ninety-six sui-
cide attempters revealed that 75 percent of them (71 per-
cent of the men and 77 percent of the women) were am-
bivalent about their intentions to die. "The ambivalent
group," the researchers stated, "are vacillating and confused
in intent, but in taking risk of death... may test the
affection and care of others. The serious attempt group are
similar to the completed suicide group in their depression,
hopelessness, and lack of social interaction." Psychiatrists
have long advanced the opinion that underlying a suicidal
individual's ostensible wish to die is actually a wish to be
rescued, which is manifested by: [A] tendency to give warn-
ing of the impending attempt to give others a chance to
intervene.... In most suicidal attempts, irrespective of the
mental state in which they are made, we can discern an
appeal to other human beings. This appeal also acts as a
powerful threat. We regard the appeal character of the
suicidal attempt, which is usually unconscious, as one of its
essential features. 7
The suicide attempt is often motivated by attempts to connect
with someone, either her doctor or someone with whom she had
a significant relationship. The patient's logic may be that her
life is not worth living because she can not get anyone to listen
to her when she wants to talk about her fears and suffering.
Dr. Susan Block, noted Harvard psychiatrist, says "[w]hen pa-
tients ask to die,... they are often really saying 'Can't you
listen to me? ... And I think good medicine, and in particular
good hospice care, can... [take care of] a lot of that. When
that is done, most requests for euthanasia [go] away."5 '
If the great majority of those requesting suicide are "treat-
able" or ambivalent at best, then why legalize suicide? The
answer is that legalizing it, while keeping it in a "care setting"
helps bring the patient out of isolation and into relationships
that can better treat the hopelessness. The irony is that by
prohibiting suicide assistance, the law may increase the
patient's isolation and desperation. By allowing for the request,
more suicides may be prevented. In any event, a caring conver-
157. Id.
158. B.D. Colen, Doctors Who Help Patients Die, NEWSDAY, Sept. 29, 1991, at 4.
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sation has an excellent chance at not ending in deadlock be-
cause the patient feels that someone cares and withdraws his
request.
What is clear to me, then, is that the law in a majority of
circuits has the opposite effect of what is intended. By prohibit-
ing physician-assisted suicide, individuals are made to take
matters into their own hands and attempt suicide. Their deci-
sions are made out of a sense of hopelessness and isolation
which is increased by their lack of control over their lives and
by the fact that they cannot get anyone to listen to them. By
allowing them to ask for help and then engaging them in a
caring conversation which might help break their isolation and
hopelessness, we might better protect against suicide.'59 It is
at least worth a try where a majority of the population in a
particular state votes to do so.
The care analysis is not just some pie-in-the-sky utopian
solution to real world problems. Many families today describe
just such discussions with their loved ones in the end-of-life
situations.6 ° Some think of the model as the family consensus
model of decision-making.' 6' It has the practical benefit that
everyone who is later likely to complain, or even sue, is brought
into the decision and has input into it. If anyone does not
agree, his or her doubts and fears and grieving must be dealt
with in conversations with the patient and other family mem-
bers.
A version of this consensus-caring process is also being used
at the beginning of life in the neonatal units around the coun-
try."'62 While such a process of decision-making is of uncertain
legality,'63 having been derived from a profound dissatisfaction
with the law and case authority in the area, it seems to "work"
in the neonatal unit." At the beginning of life, parents are in
159. See Julia Pugliese, Note, Don't Ask-Don't Tell: The Secret Practice of Physi-
cian-Assisted Suicide, 44 HAST. L.J. 1291 (1993).
160. Id.; see Michael J. Roth, Note, A Failed Statute, Geoffry Feiger, and the Phre-
netic Physician: Physician-Assisted Suicide in Michigan and a Patient-Oriented Alter-
native, 28 VAL. U. L. REV. 1415 (1994).
161. Pugliese, supra note 159, at 1316.
162. See generally Medical Technology, supra note 111.
163. Id.
164. See generally Troyen A. Brennan, Silent Decisions: Limits of Consent and the
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the hospital and are faced with the intersection of technology
and living and dying. In the neonatal units, the parents are the
ones in the relationship with the newborn and it is upon them
that the decision falls about how much technology ought to be
used to support what amount of life. Consider the anencephalic
infant with a life expectancy of less than six months. The child
may be kept from brain death a lot longer with heavy intensive
care cost.'65 Yet the baby may have no chance of ever having
a relationship with anyone. The legal approach that is now
taken is that the prolonging of life support is the joint decision
of the parents, even when the medical team agrees that treat-
ment is futile.'66 Comfort and care is routinely provided, but
respiratory, hydration, and nutrition decisions are reached by
the combined discussion of the parents and staff. If there is
disagreement, the parents make the final call, based on their
definitions of life.'67 If there is not unanimity in termination,
the state votes to prolong the life.
68
Yet notice of such decisions may carry reverse implications.
Where there is agreement that treatment is futile and it is
better that aggressive treatment and life support be terminated,
then their joint decision should be allowed to stand. This is
how it goes in many neonatal units. 69
While the decision is left with those who are in the closest
relationship with the child and who presumably care most for
the child, the role of the physician is left up in the air. The
case law provides that the physician may not contradict the
decision of the parents, even where the standard of practice or
her sense of ethics is offended by the treatment.' 0 The courts
Terminally Ill Patient, 16 LAW, MED. & HEALTH CARE 204 (1988).
165. The Washington Post reports the total cost of maintaining Baby K to be in
excess of $250,000. Marylou Tousignant & Bill Miller, Death of "Baby K Leaves a
Legacy of Legal Precedents, WASH. POST, Apr. 7, 1995, at B3.
166. In re Baby K, 16 F.3d 590 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 91 (1994).
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. See Dixie Snow Huefner, Severely Handicapped Infants with Life-Threatening
Conditions: Federal Intrusions into the Decision not to Treat, 12 AM. J. LAW & MED.
171 (1986); Carl E. Schneider, Rights Discourse and Neonatal Euthanasia, 76 CAL. L.
REV. 151 (1988); see also C. Everett Koop, Life and Death and the Handicapped New-
born, 5 IssuEs iN L. & MED. 101 (1989).
170. In re Baby K, 16 F.3d 590, 596-98 (4th Cir. 1993). The court claimed it was
interpreting the EMTALA (Emergency Medical Treatment and Active Labor Act, 42
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then treat the issue as a question of rights under a statute
rather than as a matter of balancing the interests of the ones
caring and ones cared for.171 So the decision is driven out of
the court and into a form of consensus decision-making. The
law forces the parents who do not want treatment for their
child to enter into a quiet conspiracy with the physician to turn
off the respirator. The physician and hospital, driven by the
fear of a lawsuit, engage in consensus building with the parents
about what they want to happen. The physician gives his rec-
ommendation in the face of the uncertainty that the parents
express about the prognosis. When everyone is in agreement
both medically and ethically, a decision to end life support can
be, and often is, reached.
Those who do not have the fortitude to ask that this be done
go on paying for treatment or forcing the state to provide the
resources where the treatment is beyond the standard of medi-
cal practice. Yet the law can only go so far in enforcing a right-
to-life morality. As long as the physicians give parents the
option to withdraw or withhold treatment, while providing com-
fort care, the law will not be able to prevent the termination of
life support: who is to know? Who will sue?
The obvious difference at the end of life where adults are
involved is that the circle of those in relationships with the
patient has broadened and changed. There is no automatic
hierarchy of persons who have the claim to care sufficiently for
the patient. The patient could be best loved and cared for by a
friend, a spouse, a sibling, a nephew, a nurse, or a grandchild.
The physician's ability to develop a consensus will then vary
greatly, depending on the physician's ability to determine who
should be consulted and whose decisions count. The physician is
not as helpless as in the neonatal situation in determining the
best interests of the fetus or child. In the physician-assisted
suicide case, the patient can be consulted concerning those who
ought to be brought into the decision. Once some persons are
U.S.C. § 1395dd (1992)) and was bound by its plain language to require the physi-
cian to provide respiratory care when the parents sought it. See also Medical Technol-
ogy, supra note 111, at 1591-94 (describing the competing laws and the competing
values in these treatment decisions).
171. The court's advice to amend the EMTALA is of little solace. In re Baby K, 16
F.3d at 598.
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brought in, they can be asked to identify other persons who
have a caring relationship with the patient.
The physician or nurse might complain that he or she is
placed in a difficult and time consuming process. After all,
developing a consensus takes time. Each person may have a
different opinion concerning the legitimacy of the suicide. Yet in
a group setting, with the patient present, the various opinions
must be weighed against the expressions of autonomy by the
patient. If the patient is not able to convince a person the
group thinks has a significant claim of relationship on the pa-
tient, then the decision to end life must wait, or the patient
must take the decision upon himself and act alone. 72
While some care-providers may not want to be bothered with
such a lengthy and drawn-out process, other physicians or nurs-
es who empathize with the patient's pain and concern may be
enlisted in the process. And it is this involvement in the life of
the patient, including his relationships, that guards against a
biased and hasty decision to terminate one's life.
IV. CONCLUSION
Should the law explicitly provide for a limited "right" to phy-
sician-assisted suicide or should the physician-assisted suicide
situation of the adult be handled "illegitimately," as in the
neonatal units? It is my position that physician-assisted suicide
should be made available to those who go through the care
model of decision-making. If there is consensus among physi-
172. Some might argue that this gives too much power to a single family member
or person in a significant relationship to the patient. Shouldn't there then be a right
to appeal? The problem is determining to whom they would appeal. If the appeal is
to the court, the judge, or a stranger, this imports yet another set of values into the
discussion. If the appeal is to some public health board, then its values are called
into question, and it has no investment in the care of the patient. In addition, the
problem with any appeal is that it may turn the initial discussion into an adversarial
warmup for the appeal. It is better to leave the decision with the group that has
been led in a caring discussion as a result of the patients situation and request. If
this caring group cannot persuade the one vetoer, then, just as a lone juror can dead-
lock a jury in a murder case, one lone care-provider should be able to deadlock the
physician-assisted suicide. After all, what is sought is limited access to suicide. If the
patient is ultimately blocked and feels strongly enough about it, they can still commit
suicide on their own.
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cian, nurse, patient, and those who are in significant relation-
ships with the patient, then the physician should be able to
provide life-ending assistance. The physician should be protect-
ed by a written agreement from the group that termination is
desired by the patient and is the caring thing to do. Without
such a consensus, the physician should not provide life-ending
support. Yet the opposite should also be true: where there is a
consensus that caring requires assistance, then assistance in
suicide should be provided. The law can legislate morality by
providing for a decision-making community that can be taught
to care about the patient and do the right thing for them. Oth-
erwise, the state's "all or nothing" rights-based approach has
the potential of either prematurely encouraging suicide or of
instead imprisoning a patient in their own suffering, taking
away what little dignity they might have left, and thereby in-
creasing the chance that the patient may commit suicide on his
own. 
173
173. My position is that we do what we have done in other areas where the val-
uing question is too difficult, so we take the position that it is none of the state's
business. But this does not mean that it is only the individual's business. Why not
go the route of the corporate decision-making model and make the issue one of a
group or a community of individuals in relationship with the patient and charge them
with taking a caring approach to the issue?
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